The Polish question at the Tehran conference. The last meeting of the Big Three
Today, the joint struggle of the USSR, England and the USA against Germany seems to us a matter of course. In fact, history could have gone differently - in 1943, America and England were ready to support Germany in the war against the USSR. The future of the Nazi and communist powers was finally to be determined at the Tehran meeting, which took place from November 28 to December 1, 1943.Disposition of the parties
For the United States, “local European” showdowns were not as dangerous as for Britain. The United States was worried not so much about the weakening of Germany or the USSR as about the strengthening of Britain and returning it to the status of an Atlantic superpower. Britain was afraid of the strengthening of the USSR - the transformation of the Old World into the sixteenth Soviet republic was not part of London’s plans. Hitler's Germany, in principle, could have enlisted the support of Western countries, stopped the advance of Soviet troops into Europe and remained on the political map of the world. Secret negotiations between the Germans and the West did take place. Moscow wanted the defeat of Hitler, which would allow it to strengthen its influence in the world. But defeating the Nazis without American Lend-Lease and without opening a second front in Europe was difficult, and perhaps impossible.
On the one hand, the three superpowers were already allies in the fight against fascism. England and the USA supplied the USSR with equipment and weapons, and by the autumn of 1943 the Soviet Union inflicted major defeats on Germany at Stalingrad and Kursk. On the other hand, the allies had complex and often conflicting interests. Churchill and Roosevelt went to Iran, not knowing exactly against whom they should open a second front - against Germany or the USSR.
Why Tehran?
Where to meet? Stalin proposed to do this on his territory - in the south, in Astrakhan or in the north, in Arkhangelsk. Roosevelt said that the USSR was not suitable for negotiations and proposed to gather in Alaska, to which Stalin had objections - he did not want to leave the front to “such a remote point” at such a tense time. The options of Baghdad and Cairo were also rejected. In the end, they chose Tehran. Before the start of the war, Iran sympathized with the Germans, there were German military personnel there, but in 1941, troops of the USSR and England, as well as a small number of American soldiers (to ensure Lend-Lease), entered the country. The conquest took place with lightning speed and almost bloodlessly, but a powerful German intelligence network remained in Iran. Often in the mornings, Iranians found corpses of people of European appearance on the streets - these were employees of four intelligence services, having identified an enemy agent, they killed him without trial. The situation in the capital of Iran was difficult, but controlled and manageable. The Soviet 182nd Mountain Rifle Regiment was stationed in Tehran, whose soldiers guarded the most important objects. Most Iranians respected the Soviet Union - this made the work of military intelligence representatives easier, who found willing assistants among them.
At the end of November, Stalin left Moscow. The final station where his letter train No. 501 was supposed to arrive was unknown to few people. Literny walked along the route Moscow - Stalingrad - Baku. Stalin was located in a separate armored carriage that weighed more than 80 tons. Beria was also traveling in a separate carriage. He was responsible for the security of the delegation, which included Molotov, Voroshilov, Shtemenko, senior officials of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the General Staff. On one section of the route, the train almost came under attack by German bombers. From Baku, the Soviet Secretary General flew to Tehran (for the first time in his life) by plane.
Roosevelt crossed the Atlantic on the best American battleship, Iowa. Meetings with Reich submarines were avoided, but there were still some incidents - first the Americans were caught in a serious storm, and then a torpedo was spontaneously launched on one of the escort ships, almost hitting the Iowa. After a 9-day journey, the battleship arrived at the Algerian port of Oran. From there, the American president traveled overland to Cairo, where Churchill arrived. There they agreed on positions before negotiations with Stalin and went to Tehran.
For security reasons in the Iranian capital, the US President did not stay at his own embassy, but at the Soviet one, which was located opposite the British one. A tarpaulin corridor was created between the embassies so that the movements of the leaders were not visible from the outside. The diplomatic complex thus created was surrounded by three rings of infantry and tanks. For three days of the conference, the city was completely blocked by troops and special services. In Tehran, all media activities were suspended, telephone, telegraph and radio communications were turned off. Even the families of Soviet diplomats were temporarily “evacuated” from the area of the upcoming negotiations.
"Long Jump"?
What the Germans thought and did while preparing for the meeting" big three"will most likely remain a mystery forever. Meanwhile, Stalin allegedly had secret information that the head of the sabotage department of the Foreign Intelligence Directorate of the Third Reich, Otto Skorzeny, was preparing an assassination attempt on the leaders of the allied states. His department allegedly had already developed a special sabotage operation under code name"Long Jump" Skorzeny himself denied this; The archives of the Soviet/Russian special services do not confirm the existence of such a plan. Perhaps the version of the impending assassination attempt was invented by Stalin in order to place Roosevelt in the Soviet embassy and thus protect him from the “vicious influence” of Churchill.
However, there is evidence from historians, intelligence officers and eyewitnesses of the events that Nazi Germany was still plotting to remove the Big Three. As for the main German saboteur Otto Skorzeny, who was called the leader of the Tehran operation, his reluctance to talk about it is explained by three possible reasons. First: he is unpleasant to admit that the allied intelligence services outmaneuvered his agency. Second: scouts are silent about some things even in retirement. Third: Otto Skorzeny was a double agent and worked not only for Hitler, but also for Stalin. According to those who believe in the existence of the Long Jump plan, Stalin received information about the impending assassination attempt simultaneously from several Soviet agents. Their resistances, as a rule, are not named.
If we collect all the facts collected by specialists, then this was the intention of this special operation. Having learned about the timing of the negotiations, the Germans figured out when, where and how the assassination attempt could be carried out. Firstly, it was possible to stage an attack on Roosevelt while he was moving from the American to the British embassy and back. Secondly, on November 30, 1943, Winston Churchill turns 69 years old. It is obvious that the celebration will take place in the evening on the grounds of the British Embassy, where all three leaders will gather together. The only way into the Anglo-Soviet diplomatic complex, protected from air and ground, lay... underground - one of the underground tunnels ran right under the British embassy.
Since pre-war times, an extensive and well-concealed German intelligence network, numbering about a thousand people, remained in Iran. There were agents among them who felt at home in the country. For example, SD officer Franz Mayer worked as a gravedigger at the Armenian cemetery in Tehran. SS-Hauptsturmführer Julius Schulze served as a mullah in Isfahan and preached to Muslims in the mosque every Friday that “it is the religious duty of all believers to declare jihad against the British and Russians, who insult the holy land of Islam with their presence.” Mayer was arrested a couple of months before the meeting, and during interrogation he confessed to plans to enter the embassy through a drain. After this, the British took control of the water supply system. Then the Abwehr decided to plant explosives under the building of the Soviet embassy. It was possible to penetrate the underground premises with the help of Father Mikhail, the priest of the only Orthodox church in Tehran. According to the Iranian historian Professor Muhammad Ahmadi, German intelligence officers offered the clergyman a huge sum at that time - 50 thousand British pounds - for cooperation. Despite his hatred of Stalin and the Soviets, Father Mikhail, who had served in the church since tsarist times, immediately revealed the plans of the Nazis to the employees of the Soviet embassy.
But the Germans did not lose hope. They sent two detachments of SS special forces to Iran, who settled in the vicinity of Tehran. The SS prepared three ambushes along Roosevelt’s route from the American embassy to the Soviet one, but this possibility of an attack was ruled out, since the US president did not even stop by his place, immediately going to visit Stalin. What else the SS commandos were preparing is unknown, since all documents on this case are classified. British intelligence promises to reveal them after 2017. In any case, Russian and British intelligence officers captured one of the commando squads and, with its help, destroyed the rest of the SS special forces. Then Skorzeny proposed to the Reich leadership to rent a light plane, fill it to capacity with explosives and send it to the Soviet embassy. A volunteer suicide bomber was found quickly, but by the time he was transferred to the scene of events, the politicians had already gone home.
Words and deeds about the second front
The preparation of members of the Soviet government delegation for the negotiations in Tehran was provided by the external intelligence of the NKVD and the Main Intelligence Directorate. They also obtained valuable information that helped Stalin during the negotiations. GRU officers also provided Stalin with stable and uninterrupted radio communications with Moscow.
On the afternoon of October 1, 1943, the head of military intelligence, Lieutenant General I. Ilyichev, returned from the General Staff to the Main Intelligence Directorate. The Chief of the General Staff, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. Vasilevsky, set specific tasks for military intelligence related to the upcoming meeting of the foreign ministers of the USSR, USA and Great Britain in Moscow. The arrival of the main diplomats from Washington and London (and perhaps Beijing) was expected on October 18. Military intelligence had to obtain information as soon as possible about the attitude of the United States and Great Britain to the problem of opening a second front in Europe. The General Staff was not interested in the declarative promises of the allies, but in exact data about where and when they planned to open a second front. The same data was also of interest to Foreign Minister Molotov, the head of the Soviet delegation at the Moscow meeting.
Ilyichev immediately sent special assignments to the residents of Soviet military intelligence in Washington and London. The residency in London was headed by Major General of Tank Forces Ivan Sklyarov, who was listed in the GRU under the pseudonym Brion; in New York - Colonel Pavel Melkishev, who signed his reports to the Center with the pseudonym Moliere. (It was they who obtained accurate data about, which greatly contributed to the success of the Soviet troops on the Kursk Bulge.) The tasks were very complex, and there was extremely little time to obtain information.
On October 9, the Center began to receive information; its essence boiled down to the fact that a second front in Western Europe was not opening for purely political reasons. And soon before Stalin lay a literal translation of the secret American-British plan “Overlord” - a plan for the invasion of the Allied Expeditionary Forces into the territory of northwestern France. What hurt Stalin most of all was that the development of the plan was completed in July 1943, just at the time when a tank battle unprecedented in the history of war was taking place on the Kursk Bulge on the Eastern Front. It turned out that Churchill and Roosevelt, under false pretexts, then refused to help the bleeding Soviet soldiers. And these are allies in the anti-Hitler coalition?!
The Moscow meeting was prepared and took place under the personal supervision of Lavrentiy Beria. His numerous staff took measures that completely excluded the leakage of information about the event. Mention of him in any secret correspondence was strictly prohibited. Preparations for the meeting proceeded according to a single plan, the full content of which was known only to four people: Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov and Beria.
At the Moscow meeting, the heads of the British and American delegations were amazed at Molotov’s competence. Discussions continued from October 19 to 30. As a result, the heads of the foreign policy departments of the USSR (V. Molotov), the USA (K. Hell) and Great Britain (A. Eden) signed a joint communiqué, which stated that the allied powers recognize “the primary goal is to accelerate the end of the war,” but the exact timing of the opening of the second The foreign ministers failed to agree on the front in Europe.
Moscow, Washington and London were generally pleased with the results of the meeting, which opened up prospects for negotiations at a higher level. The road to the meeting of the leaders of the three powers was open. However, the idea of holding such a meeting belonged to the US President: on May 5, 1943, Roosevelt suggested that Stalin hold a meeting that “would be informal and completely simple,” and on August 19, 1943, he wrote to him from Quebec, where he conferred with Churchill: “We are again We would like to draw your attention to the importance of the meeting of the three of us..." However, Roosevelt again hid an important detail from Stalin - he did not report the signing of an American-British agreement on joining efforts to create an atomic bomb. When intelligence presented this top secret document to Stalin, he once again thought about the “sincerity of his friends.” Is a bomb being prepared against the Soviet Union?
What the Allies Didn't Talk About
Everything fell into place when the Soviet leadership became aware that the second front would be opened only after Stalin personally promised the allies that if their expeditionary forces landed in France, the Red Army would launch a broad offensive that would not allow the Germans to transfer additional troops to the West. troops. When Stalin realized that he could get specific commitments from the Americans and British during the meeting, he accepted Roosevelt’s invitation. He also believed that the time had come to discuss other international issues with the allies. In particular, Stalin was against Roosevelt's idea, which Churchill also supported, of dividing Germany into five states; it was necessary to determine the ways of the revival of Poland, resolve the issue of the future of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, agree on the conditions for ensuring the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran, on whose territory the allied troops were located, and also resolve other issues.
An important condition for Stalin’s final decision to hold negotiations was the data obtained by military intelligence on the position of the United States and Great Britain on almost all issues of the upcoming conference. It was also possible to find out in advance what contradictions there were between Roosevelt and Churchill on the main issues of the upcoming conference. It was reported from Washington that the American president adhered to a position close to the USSR proposal: the USA and Great Britain were opening a second front in France and increasing their efforts to defeat Nazi Germany from the west. Churchill, on the contrary, wants Anglo-American troops to increase their attacks on Germany and its allies in the Balkans. It became clear that although the American president was afraid of the advance of Soviet troops into the depths of the European continent, he also did not allow the resuscitation of the British Empire and the restoration of its influence in Europe. If Churchill could not agree that England was irretrievably losing its status as a world colonial power, then Roosevelt did not share this point of view and did not want to help Churchill.
Tehran discussions
Indeed, Roosevelt proposed discussing the dismemberment of Germany after the war into five autonomous states; Stalin did not agree and proposed to transfer the consideration of the issue to the European Advisory Commission. The declaration on Iran emphasized the desire of the governments of the USSR, USA and Great Britain to “preserve the complete independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran.” About Poland: a preliminary agreement was reached that its eastern border would run along the “Curzon Line”, and its western border along the Oder River, i.e. in accordance with the secret agreements of August 23, 1939 between Molotov and Ribbentrop. The defeat of Nazi Germany was still far away, however, in a conversation with Stalin on November 29, Roosevelt proposed discussing the post-war structure of the world. The American president said that it was necessary to create an organization that could ensure long-term peace after the war. Stalin supported the idea of creating a world organization, which should be based on the principles of the United Nations.
Roosevelt and Churchill did not say a word to Stalin about uniting the efforts of the United States and Great Britain in the field of creating an atomic bomb. Although they guessed that he already knew everything.
On the evening of November 30, a gala reception was held at the British Embassy to mark Churchill's birthday. Stalin arrived at this reception in full marshal uniform, accompanied by Molotov and Voroshilov. He gave Churchill an astrakhan hat and a large porcelain sculptural group on the subject of the Russians folk tales. Roosevelt presented the British Prime Minister with an ancient Persian bowl and an Isfahan carpet. There were many toasts at the reception, but everyone remembered one. The US President said: “While we are here celebrating the birthday of the British Prime Minister, the Red Army continues to push back the Nazi hordes. For the success of Soviet weapons!”
By the evening of December 1, it became colder in Tehran. Snow suddenly fell in the mountains of Khuzistan, and weather conditions changed dramatically. This forced Roosevelt to hasten his departure from the Iranian capital. The text of the final declaration was hastily agreed upon. There was no formal signing ceremony. Signatures for this important document, as Stalin’s translator V. Berezhkov wrote, were collected “by polling. Each of the main participants in the conference individually hastily submitted their visa.” “In our hands,” wrote Berezhkov, “we are left with a fairly crumpled piece of paper with signatures written in pencil.” The appearance of the sheet was in no way in harmony with the content of the document, which became known to the whole world as the Tehran Declaration of the Three Powers. This declaration stated that the conference participants agreed on plans for the destruction of the German armed forces and came to full agreement regarding the scale and timing of operations to be undertaken from the east, west and south. “Having concluded our friendly conferences,” declared Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill, “we confidently look forward to the day when all the peoples of the world will live freely, free from tyranny, and in accordance with their various aspirations and their consciences...”
The Soviet delegation left Tehran on the afternoon of December 2. The first to take off from the Tehran airfield, which was heavily guarded by a regiment specially deployed to the Iranian capital, were two twin-engine aircraft. In one of them there was I.V. Stalin, in the second - a group of experts from the General Staff. After some time, Tehran received a message via military radio that the planes had landed in Baku.
Stalin arrived safely in Moscow, Roosevelt arrived in Washington, Churchill returned to London. In a letter to Roosevelt on December 6, 1943, Stalin, noting the success of the Tehran Conference and the special significance of its decisions, wrote: “I hope that the common enemy of our peoples – Hitler’s Germany – will soon feel this.” Roosevelt later said that Stalin persistently defended the USSR's position on every issue. “He seemed very confident,” the American president emphasized. What exactly ultimately swayed London and Washington to the decision to support Stalin will forever remain a mystery. Perhaps the key factor was Roosevelt and Stalin living under the same roof for three days. It is possible that the hat given to Churchill played a role. Perhaps the politicians were prompted to make a fateful decision by their inner instinct.
If the Germans had managed to disrupt the meeting and eliminate at least one of the leaders, then history would have taken a completely different path. However, everything happened as written in the textbooks: on June 6, 1944, the Allies landed in Normandy, and on October 10, 1946, the first General Assembly of the United Nations opened.
PS. From Stalin's conversation with Roosevelt; December 1, 1943, 15:20:
Roosevelt. The question of the incorporation of the Baltic republics into the Soviet Union may be raised in the United States, and I believe that world public opinion will find it desirable that at some future time the opinion of the peoples of these republics on this question should be expressed in some way. Therefore, I hope that Marshal Stalin will take this wish into account. I personally have no doubt that the people of these countries will vote to join the Soviet Union as unanimously as they did in 1940.
Stalin. Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia did not have autonomy before the Russian revolution. The Tsar was then in an alliance with the United States and England, and no one raised the question of the withdrawal of these countries from Russia. Why is this question being asked now?
Roosevelt. The fact is that public opinion does not know history. I would like to talk with Marshal Stalin about the internal situation in the United States. There will be elections in the United States next year. I do not wish to put forward my candidacy, but if the war continues, I may be forced to do so. There are six or seven million citizens of Polish origin in America, and therefore, being a practical man, I would not like to lose their votes. I agree with Marshal Stalin that we must restore the Polish state, and personally I have no objection to the borders of Poland being moved from east to west - all the way to the Oder, but for political reasons I cannot participate at the present time in solving this question. I share the ideas of Marshal Stalin, I hope that he will understand why I cannot publicly participate in resolving this issue here in Tehran, or even in the spring of next year.
Stalin. After Roosevelt's explanation, I understand this.
Roosevelt. There are also a number of Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians in the United States. I know that Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia both in the past and most recently formed part of the Soviet Union, and when the Russian armies re-enter these republics, I will not fight the Soviet Union over this. But public opinion may demand a plebiscite there. Stalin. As for the expression of the will of the peoples of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, we will have many occasions to give the peoples of these republics the opportunity to express their will.
Roosevelt. This will be useful to me.
Stalin. This does not mean, of course, that the plebiscite in these republics should be subject to any form of international control.
Roosevelt. Of course not. It would be useful to announce at the appropriate time that elections will take place in these republics in due course.
Stalin. Of course, this can be done. I would like to know whether the issue of leaving tomorrow has been finally decided.
Roosevelt. I was informed that tomorrow the weather will be favorable. We have few questions left to discuss this evening. Tomorrow morning I intend to fly out...
As was his custom, Stalin refused to fly anywhere by plane. He left for the conference on November 22, 1943. His letter train No. 501 proceeded through Stalingrad and Baku. Stalin was traveling in an armored spring twelve-wheeler carriage.
In the memoirs of Air Marshal Golovanov there are references to the flight of Stalin and all the Russian representatives of this conference, prepared by him personally. Two planes were flying. Golovanov personally controlled the second. The first, piloted by Viktor Grachev, carried Stalin, Molotov and Voroshilov.
Conference goals
The conference was called upon to develop a final strategy for the fight against Germany and its allies. The conference became an important stage in the development of international and inter-allied relations; a number of issues of war and peace were considered and resolved at it:
- an exact date was set for the Allies to open a second front in France (and the “Balkan strategy” proposed by Great Britain was rejected),
- discussed issues of granting independence to Iran (“Declaration on Iran”)
- the beginning of the solution to the Polish question was laid
- about the beginning of the USSR war with Japan after the defeat of Nazi Germany
- the contours of the post-war world order were outlined
- a unity of views has been achieved on issues of ensuring international security and lasting peace
Opening of the “second front”
The main issue was the opening of a second front in Western Europe.
After much debate, the Overlord issue was at a dead end. Then Stalin rose from his chair and, turning to Voroshilov and Molotov, said with irritation: “We have too much to do at home to waste time here. Nothing worthwhile, as I see it, is working out.” The critical moment has arrived. Churchill understood this and, fearing that the conference might be disrupted, made a compromise.
Polish question
W. Churchill's proposal was accepted that Poland's claims to the lands of Western Belarus and Western Ukraine would be satisfied at the expense of Germany, and the Curzon line should be the border in the east. On November 30, a gala reception was held at the British Embassy to mark Churchill's birthday.
Post-war world structure
- de facto, the right was assigned to the Soviet Union to annex part of East Prussia as an indemnity after the victory
- also, F. Roosevelt proposed dividing Germany into 5 states
Issues of ensuring security in the world after the war
US President Roosevelt outlined at the conference the American point of view regarding the creation in the future of an international security organization, which he had already spoken about in general terms to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov during his stay in Washington in the summer of 1942 and which was the subject of discussion between Roosevelt and British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in March 1943.
According to the scheme outlined by the president in a conversation with Stalin on November 29, 1943, after the end of the war it was proposed to create a world organization on the principles of the United Nations, and its activities did not include military issues, that is, it should not be similar to the League of Nations. The structure of the organization, according to Roosevelt, should have included three bodies:
- a general body consisting of all (35 or 50) members of the United Nations, which will only make recommendations and will meet in different places, where each country can express its opinion.
- an executive committee consisting of the USSR, the USA, Great Britain, China, two European countries, one Latin American country, one Middle Eastern country and one of the British dominions; The committee will deal with non-military issues.
- a police committee consisting of the USSR, USA, Great Britain and China, which will monitor the preservation of peace in order to prevent new aggression from Germany and Japan.
Stalin called the scheme outlined by Roosevelt good, but expressed his fear that small European states might be dissatisfied with such an organization, and therefore expressed the opinion that it might be better to create two organizations (one for Europe, the other for the Far East or the world). Roosevelt pointed out that Stalin's point of view partially coincides with the opinion of Churchill, who proposes to create three organizations - European, Far Eastern and American. However, Roosevelt noted that the United States could not be a member of the European organization and that only a shock comparable to the current war could force the Americans to send their troops overseas.
Assassination attempt on the leaders of the Big Three
For security purposes in the Iranian capital, the US President did not stay at his own embassy, but at the Soviet one, which was located opposite the British one (the American embassy was located much further, on the outskirts of the city in a dubious area). A tarpaulin corridor was created between the embassies so that the movements of the leaders were not visible from the outside. The diplomatic complex thus created was surrounded by three rings of infantry and tanks. For three days of the conference, the city was completely blocked by troops and special services. In Tehran, all media activities were suspended, telephone, telegraph and radio communications were turned off. Even the families of Soviet diplomats were temporarily “evacuated” from the area of the upcoming negotiations.
On the Soviet side, a group of professional intelligence officers took part in uncovering the assassination attempt on the leaders of the Big Three. Information about the impending terrorist attack was reported to Moscow from the Volyn forests by intelligence officer Nikolai Kuznetsov, and in the spring of 1943, a radiogram came from the center saying that the Germans were planning to carry out sabotage in Tehran during a conference with the participation of the leaders of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain, with the aim of sabotage is the physical removal of conference participants. All members of the group of Soviet intelligence officers led by Gevork Vartanyan were mobilized to prevent a terrorist attack.
At the end of the summer of 1943, the Germans dropped a team of six radio operators into the area of Lake Qom near the city of Qom (70 km from Tehran). After 10 days they were already near Tehran, where they boarded a truck and reached the city. From a villa prepared specially for this by local agents, a group of radio operators established radio contact with Berlin in order to prepare a springboard for the landing of saboteurs led by Otto Skorzeny. However, these ambitious plans were not destined to come true - Vartanyan’s agents, together with the British from MI6, took direction finding and deciphered all their messages. Soon, after a long search for the radio transmitter, the entire group was captured and forced to work with Berlin “under the hood”. At the same time, in order to prevent the landing of the second group, during the interception of which losses on both sides could not be avoided, they were given the opportunity to convey that they had been exposed. Upon learning of the failure, Berlin abandoned its plans.
A few days before the conference, arrests were made in Tehran, resulting in the arrest of more than 400 German agents. The last to be taken was Franz Mayer, who had gone deep underground: he was found in an Armenian cemetery, where he, having dyed and grown his beard, worked as a gravedigger. Of the large number of agents discovered, some were arrested, and most were converted. Some were handed over to the British, others were deported to the Soviet Union.
Memory of the conference
- "Tehran-43" - a 1980 feature television film about the prevention of the Tehran terrorist attack
Notes
Literature
- Tehran Conference leaders of the three allied powers - the USSR, the USA and Great Britain / Gromyko A. - M.: Publishing House of Political Literature, 1974. - T. 2. - 175 p. - (Soviet Union on international conferences period of the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945). - 100,000 copies.
- Karpov V. Generalissimo. Book 2. - M.: Veche, 2011. - 496 p. - 2000 copies. - ISBN 978-5-9533-5891-0
- Berezhkov V. Tehran 1943. - M.: Publishing House of the News Press Agency, 1968. - 128 p. - 150,000 copies.
- Churchill, Winston Spencer Closing the Ring. - Boston: Mariner Books, 1986. - Vol. 5. - 704 p. - (The Second World War). - ISBN 978-0395410592
Links
- "Three Power Declaration" and "Three Power Declaration on Iran"
- Shvanits V. G. 4-2010 Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill in Iran ( Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill in Iran, Webversion (German) )
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See what the “Tehran Conference” is in other dictionaries:
TEHRAN CONFERENCE- 1943 conference of the leaders of the three allied powers in World War II: the USSR (J.V. Stalin), the USA (F. Roosevelt) and Great Britain (W. Churchill); took place on November 28-December 1 in Tehran (Iran). The Declaration on Joint Actions in War was adopted... ... Big Encyclopedic Dictionary
TEHRAN CONFERENCE- 1943, conference of the leaders of the three allied powers in World War II: the USSR (J.V. Stalin), the USA (F. Roosevelt) and Great Britain (W. Churchill); took place on November 28-December 1 in Tehran (Iran). The Declaration on Joint Actions in War was adopted... ... Encyclopedic Dictionary
Tehran Conference- (Teheran Conference) (28 Nov. 1 Dec. 1943), meeting of Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin in the capital of Iran. During the meeting, Stalin, invited for the first time to an inter-allied conference, was informed about the upcoming opening of the Second Front on 3.... ... World history
TEHRAN CONFERENCE- - a conference of the leaders of the three allied powers - the USSR, the USA and England, which took place in Tehran on November 28 - December 1, 1943. The conference adopted a Declaration on joint actions in the war against Germany and on post-war cooperation of the three powers ... Soviet legal dictionary
Tehran Conference- Tehran Conference (1943) ... Russian spelling dictionary
Tehran Conference 1943- On November 28, December 1, 1943, a conference of the leaders of the three allied states of the anti-Hitler coalition was held in Tehran (Iran): Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Joseph Stalin, US President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister... ... Encyclopedia of Newsmakers
Tehran Conference 1943- Tehran Conference 1943, a conference of the leaders of the three powers allied in World War II: the USSR (I.V. Stalin), the USA (F. Roosevelt) and Great Britain (W. Churchill). Took place on November 28 – December 1 in Tehran (Iran). Declarations on... ... Historical Dictionary
TEHRAN CONFERENCE 1943- TEHRAN CONFERENCE 1943, a conference of the leaders of the three allied powers in World War II, participants in the anti-Hitler coalition: the USSR (J.V. Stalin), the USA (F. Roosevelt) and Great Britain (W. Churchill); took place on November 28, December 1 in... ... Russian history
Tehran Conference 1943- conference of the leaders of the three powers allied in World War II: the USSR (J.V. Stalin), the USA (F. Roosevelt) and Great Britain (W. Churchill); took place on November 28-December 1 in Tehran (Iran). Declarations on joint actions in the war against... ... were adopted. Political science. Dictionary.
TEHRAN CONFERENCE 1943- the leaders of the three allied powers took place on December 28, December 1. The head of the Soviet government I.V. Stalin, US President F. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister W. Churchill, as well as their diplomatic advisers and... took part in the conference. Diplomatic Dictionary
F.D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister W. Churchill. At the conference, held from November 28 to December 1, 1943, the “Big Three” – Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill – gathered together for the first time.
At the conference, the desire of Roosevelt and Stalin to reach an agreement was clearly outlined. Churchill initially stuck to his old strategy of isolating the Russians. Roosevelt proposed that a Soviet representative be present at all Anglo-American meetings before the general conversation. The idea of global regulation of international relations equally appealed to Roosevelt and Stalin. Churchill was conservative in this regard, did not particularly believe in post-war cooperation with the USSR, doubted the effectiveness of the future new international United Nations Organization (UN) and saw behind this idea a plan to push Great Britain to the periphery of international politics.
The main place in the work of the Tehran Conference was occupied by the coordination of plans for military action of the allies. Despite the decisions of previous allied conferences, Churchill again raised the question of postponing the landing of Anglo-American troops in France and instead conducting a series of operations in the Balkans (hoping to prevent the expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence). However, Stalin and Roosevelt opposed this, considering the north of France the only suitable place for opening a second front. It was agreed that a second front would be opened in northern France in May 1944. Stalin promised that Soviet troops would launch an offensive around the same time in order to prevent the transfer of German forces from the Eastern to the Western Front.
The Big Three agreed to try to force Turkey into the war on the side of the Allies.
The conference discussed the future of Germany. Roosevelt and Stalin spoke out in favor of breaking up Germany into small states in order to prevent a revival of German expansionism. Roosevelt proposed dividing Germany into five parts and placing Kiel, Hamburg, Ruhr and Saarland under the control of the United Nations. Stalin emphasized that the unification of Germany must be prevented at all costs. final decision on this issue, however, no decision was made.
The question of Poland was painful at the conference and controversial for Soviet-British relations. By this time, Stalin had broken relations with the Polish government in exile based in London. The Kremlin considered the question of the execution of Polish military personnel in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk, raised with the support of the British, as blackmail in order to force Moscow to make territorial concessions.
In Tehran, Stalin confirmed that the eastern Soviet-Polish border should follow the line established in September 1939, and proposed moving the western Polish border to the Oder. Realizing that Moscow would fight to the death on this issue, Churchill agreed with this proposal, noting that the lands Poland receives are much better than the lands it gives away. Stalin also stated that the USSR expected to gain Königsberg and move the border with Finland further from Leningrad.
The conference clearly indicated the agreement of the Western allies to meet Stalin halfway on the territorial issue. Here a statement was made that the post-war world would be governed by four powers (USSR, USA, England, France), operating under the auspices of a new international organization. For the USSR this was a colossal breakthrough; The United States also assumed global functions for the first time since Wilson; Great Britain, whose role was relatively diminishing, had to be content with the fact that it did not fall out of the Big Three.
The conference adopted the “Declaration on Iran,” in which participants declared “their desire to preserve the full independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran.”
In conclusion, Stalin made a promise that the USSR would enter the war against Japan after the defeat of Germany.
The Tehran Conference strengthened the cooperation of the main powers of the anti-fascist coalition and agreed on plans for military action against Germany.
APPLICATION
Declaration of the Three Powers
We, the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain and the Premier of the Soviet Union, have met for the past four days in the capital of our ally Iran and have formulated and reaffirmed our common policy.
We express our determination that our countries will work together both in times of war and in subsequent peacetime.
Regarding the war, representatives of our military headquarters participated in our round table negotiations, and we agreed on our plans for the destruction of the German armed forces. We have come to full agreement regarding the scale and timing of the operations to be undertaken from the east, west and south.
The mutual understanding we have achieved here guarantees our victory.
As for peacetime, we are confident that the agreement that exists between us will ensure lasting peace. We fully recognize the great responsibility that rests on us and on all the United Nations to bring about a peace that will receive the approval of the overwhelming mass of peoples globe and which will eliminate the disasters and horrors of war for many generations.
Together with our diplomatic advisers, we looked at the challenges of the future. We will seek the cooperation and active participation of all countries, large and small, whose peoples are committed in heart and mind, like our own people, to the task of eliminating tyranny, slavery, oppression and intolerance. We will welcome them to join the global family of democracies whenever they wish to do so.
No power in the world can stop us from destroying the German armies on land, their submarines at sea, and destroying their munitions factories from the air.
Our offensive will be merciless and increasing.
Having concluded our friendly conferences, we confidently look forward to the day when all the peoples of the world will live freely, free from tyranny, and in accordance with their various aspirations and their consciences.
We came here with hope and determination. We leave here truly friends in spirit and purpose.
ROOSEVELT
STALIN
CHURCHILL
The Tehran Conference is the first of three conferences between the leaders of the three world powers. It was not so easy for them to get together. The main problem was Stalin.
Why Tehran?
Stalin refused to come to previous meetings, justifying his refusals on various grounds. Stalin did not come to the conference in Cairo that took place before Tehran because a representative of China was there. China was at war with Japan, and the Soviet Union remained neutral with Japan. In addition, it is also known that Stalin was afraid of airplanes. Even in Tehran, he most likely eventually arrived by train via Baku.
Tehran was chosen as the meeting location for several reasons. The main one is that, in fact, Iran was occupied by Soviet and British troops and was ruled by a “puppet” government. De facto. Several units of Soviet troops were located in the capital of Iran. Cairo, Basra, Beirut were considered as compromise options, but Tehran was the most convenient.
Roosevelt and Stalin
Roosevelt would have been more interested in meeting Stalin than anyone else. It was fundamentally important for him to know the position of the USSR in the war with Japan. Roosevelt was going to “charm” Stalin; he was famous for his “courtship.” The American president viewed the Tehran conference not as a meeting of three, but as a meeting of "two and a half." Churchill was "half".
Safety
Security issues at the Tehran conference were resolved at the highest level. The British embassy, where the meetings took place, was surrounded by several rings of security; during the conference, communications in Tehran were cut off and media outlets were banned. Such “sterility” would be impossible anywhere else. The excellent security organization made it possible to prevent the “attack of the century” organized by Otto Skorzeny.
Churchill
Churchill solved his problems at the Tehran Conference. It was they who proposed a solution to the “Polish question”. It was important for Churchill that both the USSR and the USA began to view Great Britain as an equal power. Churchill was, of course, an experienced politician, but during the Tehran Conference, he played, by and large, second fiddle. The first were Stalin and Roosevelt. Neither one nor the other liked Churchill, and it was precisely because of dislike for Churchill that a rapprochement between Roosevelt and Stalin took place. Diplomacy is a delicate matter. By the way, on the occasion of Churchill’s birthday, November 30, a gala reception was held at the embassy.
"Long Jump"
Operation Long Jump was characterized by the breadth of its design and the same breadth of stupidity. Hitler planned to kill “three birds with one stone” with one blow, but the miscalculation was that the “hares” were not so simple. A group led by Otto Skoczeny was tasked with eliminating Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt in Tehran. Kaltenbrunner himself coordinated the operation.
German intelligence learned of the time and location of the conference in mid-October 1943 by deciphering the American naval code. Soviet intelligence quickly uncovered the plot.
A group of Skorzeny’s militants underwent training near Vinnitsa, where Medvedev’s partisan detachment operated. According to one version of the development of events, Kuznetsov established friendly relations with a German intelligence officer, Oster. Having owed Kuznetsov, Oster offered to pay him with Iranian carpets, which he was going to bring to Vinnitsa from a business trip to Tehran. This information, transmitted by Kuznetsov to the center, coincided with other data about the impending action. 19-year-old Soviet intelligence officer Gevork Vartanyan gathered a small group of agents in Iran, where his father, also an intelligence officer, posed as a wealthy merchant. Vartanyan managed to discover a group of six German radio operators and intercept their communications. The ambitious Operation Long Jump failed, leaving the Big Three unscathed. This was another failure of Otto Skorzenny, a great adventurer and not the most successful saboteur. The saboteurs wanted to enter the British embassy through a pipe leading from the Armenian cemetery.
Skorzeny’s operation even helped Soviet intelligence: about four hundred people were detained in Iran. The German network was practically destroyed.
Stalin and the prince
According to the memoirs of Gevork Vartanyan, when the Tehran Conference ended, only one of the three leaders of world powers, Joseph Stalin, went to express gratitude to the young Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, for the reception, and the British expelled Reza Shah from the country. Of course, the young Shah was not ready for such a visit. When Stalin entered the Shah's chamber, the young Tsar jumped up from his throne, ran up, knelt down and wanted to kiss Stalin's hand, but the leader of the USSR did not allow this and raised the Shah from his knees. This very event, that Stalin expressed gratitude for the reception to the head of Iran, had a huge resonance. Neither Roosevelt nor Churchill did this.
Redivision of the world
At the Tehran conference, in fact, all the decisions that were developed during the Yalta and Postdam conferences were adopted. The Tehran Conference was the most important of the three. The following decisions were made:
1. An exact date was set for the Allies to open a second front in France (and the “Balkan strategy” proposed by Great Britain was rejected).
2. Issues about granting independence to Iran were discussed (“Declaration on Iran”).
3. The beginning has been made of resolving the Polish question.
4. The question of the USSR starting a war with Japan after the defeat of Nazi Germany.
5. The contours of the post-war world order were outlined.
6. A unity of views has been achieved on issues of ensuring international security and lasting peace.
Since the creation of the anti-Hitler coalition, the main problem was the opening of the front by the Allies in Western Europe. JV Stalin addressed this proposal to W. Churchill and F. Roosevelt, but the leadership of Great Britain and the USA pursued a policy of wait-and-see.
Under the influence of the victories of the Soviet armed forces and the growing liberation struggle of the peoples of Europe, the United States and England began to lean towards intensifying actions on the European continent. Seeing that the Soviet army, crushing the Nazi troops, was successfully advancing to the west, the political and military leaders of the USA and England began to fear that the USSR could win the war without their help. In December 1942, W. Churchill came to the conclusion that it was necessary to reconsider the situation to find ways to use the British and American armies directly on the continent. On August 27, the deputy chief of operations at the US Army headquarters, in a memorandum expressing the sentiments of part of the military, stated: “... in order to prevent Soviet domination in post-war Europe, concentrate the main forces in Western Europe and capture Berlin before the arrival of Soviet troops there.”
However, along with the emerging tendency “so as not to be late” in the policy of the ruling circles of the Western powers, 108 the tendency “so as not to rush” remained, most clearly manifested in the delay in the opening of the second front.
Plans for the further conduct of the war by the Western powers were determined by the decisions of the conference of the heads of government of the United States and England in Quebec in August 1943. At it, the contracting parties put forward the proposal: “In cooperation with Russia and other allies, achieve the unconditional surrender of the European Axis countries as soon as possible.” In addition, the task was also set to expand pressure on Japan.
At the end of 1943 and into 1944, the Allies planned to continue bombing Germany in order to undermine its military and economic power. On land, the main offensive was considered Operation Overlord (invasion of North-West France), the start of which was scheduled for May 1, 1944. After the Allied troops strengthened in France, it was planned to strike Germany.
But the agreement in Quebec on military operations in Europe was largely inconclusive, compromise, even formal. The question of the role and correlation of military operations in the Mediterranean and in Operation Overlord has not received a final resolution either. The British insisted on delivering the main blow in the Mediterranean, and the Americans - through the English Channel. The Mediterranean Sea area became the main point of serious disagreement between the British and Americans on issues of strategic planning.
Thus, at the end of 1943, the political and military leadership of the United States and England did not have a unified view on the further conduct of the war in Europe. The decisions of the Quebec Conference on military action against Japan were largely preliminary.
The main countries of the anti-Hitler coalition, having agreed on the main goal - “accelerating the end of the war,” did not have coordinated action plans for their troops to achieve it. Success largely depended on the decisive and coordinated actions of all members of the coalition, which the Soviet Union had long sought. The military-political situation made both the ruling circles of the United States and England understand this. Moreover, with the end of the war approaching, it was necessary to reconcile the problems of the post-war system. There is a need for a meeting of the leaders of the three powers.
The need and importance of such a meeting was recognized by I. Stalin, F. Roosevelt and W. Churchill in correspondence between them in the summer of 1943. Tehran was chosen as the venue for the conference. The conference of the heads of government of the three leading powers of the anti-fascist coalition was held in Tehran from November 28 to December 1, 1943.
By November 28, delegations of the three powers were already in Tehran. The day after F. Roosevelt’s arrival, V. Molotov informed the allies about the danger of a terrorist attack. Therefore, the US President accepted the invitation to live in the Soviet embassy building. Churchill preferred to work in the British diplomatic mission, but he came to meetings at the Soviet embassy along a specially built corridor that connected the two diplomatic missions.
Hitler really wanted to destroy the Big Three at once. To carry out the assassination attempt, Operation Long Jump was developed, for which several groups led by Otto Skorzeny were sent to Iran. But the assassination attempt was foiled even at the preparation stage. This anti-terrorist operation was carried out by the legendary resident of Soviet intelligence in Tehran, Ivan Ivanovich Agayants.
Thanks to Agayants, “light cavalry” was created in Tehran. This was the name given to a group of young guys who searched for Nazi agents while riding bicycles around the Iranian capital. The group was led by 16-year-old Gevork Vartanyan, the son of a wealthy confectionery entrepreneur (in this capacity, Vartanyan’s father was known throughout Tehran, and only a few insiders knew that he worked for Soviet intelligence). The guys from Vartanyan's group were the first to reach the German paratroopers who had landed in the Kum area - then the agents were neutralized. Due to the failure of the advance group of agents in Berlin, they decided not to send the remaining participants in Operation Long Jump.
During its work, Vartanyan’s “light cavalry” identified about 400 enemy agents. (Subsequently, Gevork Vartanyan became the second Hero of the Soviet Union in the history of Soviet foreign intelligence after the legendary Nikolai Kuznetsov).
The Tehran Conference focused on the following issues:
1) opening of the Second Front;
2) the entry of the USSR into the war with Japan;
3) creation in the future of an international security organization;
4) the structure of Germany after its defeat;
5) solution to the Polish issue;
6) on economic assistance to Iran;
7) about Turkey’s entry into the war.
The main issue at the conference was the opening of a Second Front. The USSR delegation entered into negotiations with the firm intention of finally agreeing on the date of the landing of American-British troops in Western Europe. The positions of the US and British delegations on this issue were very contradictory, which determined the severity of the ensuing controversy. W. Churchill sought to make the opening of the Second Front dependent on the development of operations in the Mediterranean theater. He considered the primary task to be the deployment of an offensive in Italy, the capture of Rome and access to the Pisa-Rimini line. In his opinion, such actions would have a significant impact on the Romanians, who were looking for a way out of the war, as well as on Hungary and other countries.
Thus, the essence of the British strategy was obvious. The British prime minister, like Roosevelt, sought to prevent the Soviet army from advancing deeply to the west. And he hoped to achieve this by developing operations in Italy and the Balkans. In this case, in his opinion, Anglo-American troops could get ahead of the Soviet army and be the first to enter South-Eastern and Central Europe.
This position was completely clear to everyone present at the conference. Stalin also understood this and insisted that best result would give a blow to the enemy in Northern or Northwestern France. The Italian theater, in his opinion, was not suitable for an attack on Germany, because the Alps blocked the way to it.
After lengthy discussions about the Second Front, it was decided that the Western Allies would launch Operation Overlord in May and a supporting operation in Southern France (Anvil), if possible in on a large scale. For its part, the leadership of the USSR committed itself to launching an offensive at about the same time in order to prevent the transfer of German troops from the eastern to the western front. On December 1, 1943, I. Stalin, F. Roosevelt and W. Churchill initialed the military decisions of the Tehran Conference.
Of great importance for strengthening the unity of the anti-Hitler coalition and the speedy end of the war was the statement of the head of the Soviet government about entering the war with Japan after the surrender of Germany.
This statement by the Soviet delegation had enormous military-political significance and far-reaching international consequences. From the very beginning of the war with Japan, the United States hoped for the USSR to join it. Statement by the Soviet Government the best way solved this problem and removed the issue that bothered Roosevelt so much. Churchill subsequently wrote that the Soviet statement was of “the greatest significance” and was one of the “decisive events” of the conference.
At the conference, the United States proposed creating an international security organization in the future. It should be based on the principles of the United Nations and have three bodies: an Assembly of representatives of all members of the United Nations; An executive committee consisting of the USSR, the USA, Great Britain, China, two European countries, one Latin American, one Middle Eastern country, one Asian (except China) and one British dominion, dealing with all non-military problems: economic, food, health, etc. ; A police committee of four countries that would ensure that peace was maintained and that new aggression from Germany and Japan was prevented.
The heads of the USSR and England spoke in favor of creating such an international organization. The discussion of this issue showed the desire of the three powers for post-war cooperation.
When discussing the question of the fate of Germany, the Western allies proposed dividing Germany into parts that, in essence, would represent independent states. When discussing this issue, W. Churchill put forward a plan for isolating Prussia, separating its southern lands from the rest of Germany - Bavaria, Baden, Württemberg, Palatinate (Rhine Palatinate - modern Rhineland-Palatinate) from the Saarland to Saxony and including them in the Danube Federation. It should be noted that Churchill proposed dividing all of post-war Europe into federations and confederations - Scandinavian, Danube, Balkan and others, then into a European council of 10 states and, finally, the United States of Europe. The purpose of these new formations was one - to preserve the old order, strengthen British positions in Europe and unite it against the USSR. The United States greeted these plans sympathetically.
The Soviet government opposed it. The Soviet Union saw the solution to the German problem not in the dismemberment of Germany, but in its demilitarization and democratization with the liquidation of the Hitlerite state and the punishment of its leaders, as well as the destruction of the fascist “new order” in Europe.
When discussing the Polish issue, the heads of government of the USSR, USA and England agreed that the Polish émigré government should abandon attempts to secede Western Ukraine and Western Belarus from the USSR and recognize the “Curzon Line” as the border between the USSR and Poland. The conference agreed that the Polish state should be located between the so-called “Curzon line” and the river line. Oder.
A declaration on Iran was signed in Tehran, which recognized the assistance provided by this country to the anti-fascist coalition, especially in transporting goods to the Soviet Union; in return, the allies agreed to provide economic assistance to Iran during the war and in the post-war period. They also stated their desire to maintain Iran's full independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.
The conference decisions also noted that, from a military point of view, it was desirable that Turkey enter the war on the side of the Allies before the end of 1943.
Thus, the most important result of the Tehran Conference was the coordination of the military efforts of the USSR, the USA and England against Nazi Germany, the adoption of decisions on the opening of the Second Front in Western Europe and the entry of the USSR into the war against Japan, the discussion of issues about the post-war structure of Germany and Polish borders, the prospects for creating an international organizations for security and post-war cooperation of the USSR, USA and Great Britain. The decisions taken in Tehran contributed to the further strengthening of the anti-Hitler coalition.