• Battle of Kursk, Tehran Conference. Meetings of the Big Three

    The conference of the leaders of the three allied powers - the USSR, the USA and Great Britain, held in Tehran on November 28 - December 1, 1943, is one of the largest diplomatic events of the Second World War. It became an important stage in the development of international and inter-allied relations of this period.

    The Tehran Conference, during which a number of the most important issues of war and peace were considered and resolved, played a significant role in uniting the anti-Hitler coalition to achieve final victory in the war and in creating the foundation for the further development and strengthening of Soviet-Anglo-American relations.

    The meeting in Tehran convincingly showed that, despite the fundamental differences in the political and social system of the USSR, on the one hand, and the USA and England, on the other, these countries could successfully cooperate in the fight against a common enemy, sought and found a mutually acceptable solution to the problems that arose between them controversial issues, although they often approached these issues from completely different positions.

    The military and political cooperation of the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain during the Second World War is one of the greatest lessons of history that cannot be forgotten.

    The purpose of this work is to reflect the contradictions that arose at the Tehran Conference between its participants on key problems of international politics, and to determine the significance of the conference for the further conduct of war and the structure of peace.

    The objectives are to reveal the positions of each party on the main issues and reflect the decisions made by the conference.

    1. The Tehran Conference is the first meeting of the heads of three governments.

    At the suggestion of the Soviet government, the conference took place in Tehran, from November 28 to December 1, 1943. The Tehran Conference is one of the largest diplomatic events of the Second World War. It became an important stage in the development of international and inter-allied relations of this period.

    The meeting in Tehran, during which a number of the most important issues of war and peace were considered and resolved, played a significant role in uniting the anti-Hitler coalition to achieve final victory in the war and in creating the foundation for the further development and strengthening of Soviet-Anglo-American relations.

    The Tehran Conference convincingly showed that, despite the fundamental differences in the political and social system of the USSR, on the one hand, and the USA and England, on the other, these countries could successfully cooperate in the fight against a common enemy, sought and found a mutually acceptable solution to disputes that arose between them issues, although they often approached these issues from completely different positions.

    It was in Tehran that the exact date for the opening of a second front by the Allies in France was finally set and the British “Balkan strategy”, which led to a prolongation of the war and an increase in the number of its victims and disasters, was rejected. The decision taken by the conference to inflict a joint and final blow on Nazi Germany was fully consistent with the interests of all countries that were part of the anti-Hitler coalition.

    The Tehran Conference outlined the contours of the post-war world order and achieved a unity of views on issues of ensuring international security and lasting peace. The meeting in Tehran had a positive impact on inter-allied relations and strengthened trust and mutual understanding between the leading powers of the anti-Hitler coalition.

    The Tehran conference of the leaders of the three allied powers took place in an atmosphere of outstanding victories of the Soviet armed forces, which led to the completion of a radical turning point in not only the Great Patriotic War, but also throughout the Second World War. The Nazis had already been expelled from Donbass and left-bank Ukraine. November 6, 1943 Kyiv was liberated. By the end of 1943 More than half of the territory of the USSR captured by the enemy was cleared. However, Nazi Germany remained a strong opponent. She still controlled the resources of almost all of Europe.

    The results and consequences of the victories of the Soviet Army radically changed the military-political situation in the world, as well as the alignment and balance of forces in the international arena.

    The scale of the military operations of the Western allies was, of course, incomparable with the military operations of the Soviet troops. Having landed in Italy after its surrender in September 1943, the Anglo-American troops were opposed by only 9-10 German divisions, while on the Soviet-German front 26 enemy divisions operated against the Soviet troops, of which 210 were German. And yet, by the end of 1943. the victory of the allied countries over the common enemy has come much closer, and relations between them have strengthened and strengthened.

    This was confirmed by the results of the Moscow conference of the foreign ministers of the USSR, USA and Great Britain, as well as the achievement of an agreement on a meeting of the leaders of the three allied powers in Tehran.

    The conference with the participation of the leaders of the USSR I. Stalin, the USA - F. Roosevelt and Great Britain - W. Churchill was held from November 28 to December 1, 1943 in the city of Tehran and went down in history under the name Tehran. On it, Joseph Stalin, Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill met together for the first time.

    In addition to the heads of state, the conference included foreign ministers and military advisers. The Soviet delegation was represented by V. Molotov, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and Marshal K. Voroshilov.

    For the first time, the idea of ​​​​convening the “Big Three” was proposed by the leaders of the United States and Great Britain at the Quebec Conference, which took place in August forty-three. The meeting place for the participants was Tehran, suggested by I. Stalin.

    “Eureka” was the code word coined for the Tehran Conference.

    At the Tehran Conference, military issues were resolved, the most important of which was the opening of a second front in Europe.

    Conference decisions

    The conference participants decided how to redeploy Allied forces to Europe. Roosevelt proposed an invasion of Europe across the English Channel in early May 1944. The proposed plan was called "Overlord". The delegation from the USSR believed that it would be more effective to support Operation Overlord with a landing on the territory of Southern France. Military operations in Italy and the Balkans were proposed by Winston Churchill.

    On the first day of December 1943, all proposals of the conference in Tehran were pre-signed by the participants - the heads of state of the Big Three.

    The main thing in these decisions was the start of Operation Overlord - May 1944, together with the landing in Southern France, a special role here was assigned to Soviet troops, who would have to prevent the transfer of fascist troops from the territory of the USSR to the Western Front. Close cooperation between the military headquarters of the upcoming military operations was expected. The purpose of this cooperation is to confuse the enemy regarding the main purpose of the operations.

    The Allies also planned to drag Turkey into hostilities with Nazi troops.

    During discussions of issues related to the second front, Joseph Stalin stated that the Soviet Union intended to go to war with Japan in the event of Germany's complete surrender, despite the neutrality of this state.

    At the same time, the heads of state discussed issues of the post-war world. The United States proposed the dismemberment of Germany after the end of the war into five independent states. Churchill proposed separating Prussia from Germany, and creating the Danube Confederation from Austria and Hungary, together with the southern regions. The delegation from the USSR did not support these statements.

    Discussions on the German question were referred to the European Advisory Commission.

    Conference results

    In Tehran, it was decided to transfer the city of Königsberg to the possession of the Soviet state. Now this is the city of Kaliningrad.

    At the Tehran Conference, the issue of the so-called “Curzon Line” was resolved - the established borders of Poland in the east and west along the Oder River. Western Ukraine and Belarus went to the USSR.

    During the conference, the participants signed the “Declaration on Iran”, preserving the inviolability and sovereignty of Iran.

    The final document of the Tehran Conference was the “Declaration of the Three Powers”. It agreed on plans for the defeat of German military forces in terms of time and size of operations that were supposed to be carried out from the west, east and south. The conference participants thereby proved their readiness to continue their cooperation after the war.

    TEHRAN CONFERENCE 1943, a conference of heads of government of the three leading powers anti-Hitler coalition. It took place November 28 – December 1. Code name "Eureka". The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR I.V. took part in its work. Stalin, US President F. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister W. Churchill.

    The agenda was not developed in advance; many issues were discussed only in a preliminary manner, subsequently becoming the subject of detailed consideration at the Crimean (Yalta) Conference of 1945 and at the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference of 1945.

    The main issues in the work of the Tehran Conference were military issues, primarily the problem of opening second front in Europe. Each side outlined its point of view on the scale, place and time of the landing of Anglo-American troops. Roosevelt stood for the implementation of what was adopted by the heads of government of the United States and Great Britain in August. 1943 at the Quebec conference of the Overlord plan, which involved an amphibious operation in northern France. Churchill, without directly objecting to this, proposed expanding operations in Italy and the Balkans. This would allow the Anglo-Amer. troops to occupy Central Europe and reach the Black Sea. Head of the owls delegations throughout Tehran Conference pursued the idea that the best result would be a strike against the enemy in Northern or Northwestern France with a simultaneous landing in the south of France, i.e. actually supported the Overlord plan.

    The Western allies, agreeing with this point of view, did not abandon their military-strategic plans in South-Eastern Europe. They proposed expanding assistance to the Yugoslav partisans and involving Turkey in the war against Germany. Stalin acknowledged the feasibility of these proposals, but noted that they should not delay Operation Overlord and that Turkey “will not enter the war, no matter how much pressure we put on it.” During the discussion about the opening of a second front, the statement of the head of the Soviets was important. government that the USSR, at the request of its allies, is ready, after the surrender of Germany, to enter the war with Japan.

    Considering that Germany unleashed two world wars within 25 years, special attention to Tehran Conference devoted to the issues of its post-war structure. Churchill said that the Allies are obliged to ensure security in the world for at least 50 years and proposed dividing Germany into several new states. formations. Roosevelt put forward a plan to divide Germany into 5 states. Stalin believed that there were no measures that could exclude the possibility of German unification. He proposed to grant independence to Hungary and Austria, and to solve the problem of Germany through its demilitarization and democratization. As a result, the issue was referred to the European Advisory Commission for study.

    Participants Tehran Conference discussed the issue of Poland, agreeing preliminary that its post-war borders should run along the “Curzon Line” in the east and along the river. Oder in the west. Sov. the side did not support the wishes of the Western allies to recognize the Sov. Union of the Polish Exile Government in London, declaring that it separates Poland from this government.

    Based on the results of the work Tehran Conference three documents were adopted: “Military decisions of the Tehran Conference” (not subject to publication), “Declaration of the Three Powers” ​​and “Declaration of the Three Powers on Iran” (were published in the press).

    In the first, the parties pledged to help the struggle of the Yugoslav partisans as much as possible. Participants Tehran Conference noted the desirability of Turkey entering the war on the side of the Allies. The USA and Great Britain committed themselves to carry out Operation Overlord during May 1944, together with the operation in Southern France, and the Soviets. side - to begin the offensive at this time. army in order to prevent the transfer of German forces from the Eastern to the Western Front.

    The second document, stating the determination of the three great powers to cooperate both in the war and in the post-war period, emphasized that they had agreed on plans for the destruction of the German armed forces on the timing and scale of operations undertaken from the east, west and south.

    In the declaration on Iran, the parties positively assessed the assistance provided by Iran in the war against a common enemy, committed themselves to further feasible economic support for this country, and expressed a desire to preserve the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran.

    Research Institute (Military History) VAGS of the RF Armed Forces

    Tehran Conference

    After completing negotiations in Cairo, Roosevelt and Churchill went to Tehran, where they met with the Soviet delegation led by Stalin.

    For four days - from November 28 to December 1, 1943 - the heads of government of the USSR, USA and England exchanged views on the most important issues of war and peace. The delegations included foreign ministers and military advisers. Instead of US Secretary of State K. Hull, G. Hopkins took part in the Tehran Conference. The conference did not have a pre-agreed agenda; each delegation retained the right to raise any issues of interest to it. Participants expressed their points of view not only at joint plenary sessions, but also during bilateral meetings, as well as conversations at protocol events.

    Considering the distance of the American embassy from the conference site and the resulting inconvenience and threat to the safety of the American president, the head of the Soviet delegation invited the president to stay at the Soviet embassy. The British embassy was located next to the Soviet one. The President accepted the invitation with satisfaction.

    The Big Three dialogue began in Tehran with a conversation between Stalin and Roosevelt, which took place on November 28, even before the official opening of the conference. Over the course of an hour, the interlocutors touched upon a significant number of issues: the situation on the Soviet-German front, preparations for the opening of a second front in Europe, military operations against Japan (Stalin: “...Chiang Kai-shek’s troops fight poorly”), prospects for Soviet-American relations (Roosevelt: “ ...The Americans will need large quantities of raw materials after the war, and therefore ... there will be close trade ties between our countries"), the situation in Lebanon, the future role of France (Roosevelt: “The French will have to work a lot before France really becomes a great power”), fate colonial territories (Stalin: “...We need to think about how to replace the old colonial regime with a freer regime”), post-war development of India (Roosevelt: “It would be better to create in India something like the Soviet system...”), distribution of the merchant fleet and some other .

    The conversation participants did not strive to find mutually acceptable solutions. They rather probed each other, briefly and laconically expressed their thoughts, discovering that many of their assessments coincided. This also concerned the interlocutors’ attitude to Churchill’s position on a number of issues: about the future of the colonial peoples, about the fate of India, about the role of France.

    Churchill was extremely dissatisfied with the very fact of this conversation between Stalin and Roosevelt. The British Prime Minister asked Roosevelt to meet with him that same day in the morning in order to discuss in advance military issues that were to be discussed with Stalin at the first plenary session of the conference, which opened at 4 pm. “However, Roosevelt was adamant,” notes A. Harriman. “First of all, he wanted to meet Stalin and talk to him alone in the presence of only an interpreter.”

    The wide range of issues considered at the conference can be divided into two categories: those related to the conduct of war and those related to the post-war world order.

    The main focus of the conference was on military issues. At the very first plenary meeting, the heads of delegations outlined in detail their assessment of the situation at the fronts and further prospects for military operations. Despite the fact that a radical change occurred on the Soviet-German front and the Red Army successfully expelled the Nazi occupiers from the territory of the USSR, the Soviet government advocated the full and effective use of the enormous military and economic potential of the Allied powers, persistently demanding the organization of large military operations in Western Europe. Europe. It believed that this would lead to a reduction in the duration of the war, to the preservation of millions of human lives and enormous material values.

    “I think,” Stalin said at the first meeting of the Tehran Conference, “that history spoils us. She gave us very great strength and very great opportunities. “I hope that we will take all measures to ensure that at this meeting, in due measure, within the framework of cooperation, we use the power and authority that our peoples have entrusted to us.”

    Although at previous Anglo-American meetings the decision to land in France in 1944 seemed to have been made, nevertheless subsequently, at the Moscow conference, as well as from correspondence between the heads of government, it became obvious that the British government was again seeking to cast doubt on the opening of a second front in Europe in 1944. These fears were confirmed at the Tehran conference. Speaking with an analysis of the military situation on the fronts, Churchill gave clear preference to the development of military operations in the Balkans and in the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea. Churchill gave a special place in these plans to Turkey's participation in the war. “If we could win over Turkey to our side,” he advertised his idea, “then it would be possible, without diverting a single soldier, not a single ship or aircraft from the main and decisive fronts, to establish dominance over the Black Sea with the help of submarines and light naval forces, extend the right hand to Russia and supply her armies with much less expensive and more fast way and much more abundantly than through the Arctic and the Persian Gulf.”

    Churchill used all his eloquence to make the opening of a second front in Western Europe dependent on the success of his proposed action in the southeastern part of the European continent. More than once he launched into long discussions on the same topic - about operations in Italy, landings in Yugoslavia, on the island of Rhodes, in Turkey.

    The political implications of Churchill's strategy were obvious. “Whenever,” President Roosevelt later told his son Elliot, “when the Prime Minister insisted on an invasion through the Balkans, it was perfectly clear to everyone present what he really wanted. “He first of all wants to drive a wedge into Central Europe in order to prevent the Red Army from entering Austria and Romania and even, if possible, Hungary.”

    Churchill’s Italo-Balkan-Turkish plans, aimed essentially at recreating an anti-Soviet “cordon sanitaire,” did not meet either the general goals of the struggle of the anti-Hitler coalition or the objective conditions of waging war in Europe. Shifting the center of gravity of Allied operations to the Mediterranean region, located far from the most important strategic, economic and political centers of Hitler's Germany, would have resulted in a further prolongation of the war and an increase in the number of its victims. The Chief of Staff of the US Army, General Marshall, directly stated at a meeting with President Roosevelt on the eve of the Tehran Conference that the result of an operation in the Balkans would be an extension of the war both in Europe and in Pacific Ocean.

    Stalin spoke at the conference against Churchill's plan. He said that if the conference is called to discuss military issues, then the USSR considers the implementation of Operation Overlord, that is, the landing in Western Europe, as the most important and decisive of them. He emphasized: “We Russians believe that best result would give a blow to the enemy in Northern or Northwestern France.” The head of the Soviet government insisted that Operation Overlord be the main one for the Allies in 1944 and that, simultaneously with this operation, a landing in southern France be undertaken as a diversionary maneuver in support of Operation Overlord.

    According to the Soviet delegation, the following three main issues were to be resolved at the conference: first, the start date for Operation Overlord was set; secondly, a decision was made on the simultaneous landing of allied troops in the south of France and, thirdly, the issue of the commander-in-chief of Operation Overlord was resolved. As for the timing of Operation Overlord, the Soviet delegation believed that it should begin no later than May 1944.

    The American government also did not share the British Prime Minister's opinion regarding the operation in the Balkans. “Any operation undertaken in the eastern Mediterranean,” Roosevelt said at the conference, “would entail a postponement of Operation Overlord until June or July.” Therefore, he proposed that "military experts consider the possibility of organizing a landing in the south of France within the time frame proposed by Stalin."

    Roosevelt expressed his point of view on this issue even more openly in a conversation with his son Elliot. “I am sure of one thing,” he said. – If the path to a speedy victory comes at the cost minimal losses on the American side lies in the west, and only in the west, and we do not need to needlessly sacrifice our landing craft, people and equipment for operations in the Balkans - and our chiefs of staff are convinced of this - then there is nothing more to say...

    I think, I hope, Churchill understood that this is our opinion and that it will not change."

    Churchill, however, continued to insist on his own. Unable to reject Operation Overlord, he nevertheless clung to his “Balkan strategy” in every possible way and asked at one of the conference meetings to note in the minutes that he would under no circumstances agree to “suspend the operations of the Mediterranean armies, including twenty English and divisions subordinate to the British, moreover, only in order to precisely meet the deadline - the first of May - the beginning of Operation Overlord.

    What tricks did Churchill resort to in order to achieve the adoption of a decision that suited him? Thus, at one of the conference meetings, he tried to portray the position of his opponents as a call for the inaction of the numerous British troops stationed in the Mediterranean region. Churchill did not agree with this alleged formulation of the question. “We must help our Russian friends,” he exclaimed with pathos. To this, Stalin remarked sarcastically: “According to Churchill, it turns out that the Russians demand from the British that the British do nothing.”

    Finally, in order to delay the decision on the issue of Operation Overlord, Churchill proposed entrusting the entire range of complex military issues to the final approval of military advisers. Stalin strongly objected to this, realizing that this was another trick of the British Prime Minister. He said that this issue can be resolved more effectively and quickly by the heads of government themselves.

    The prime minister’s intractability and stubbornness forced Stalin to ask Churchill point-blank: “...Do they (the British) believe? V.I.) into Operation Overlord or are they just talking about it to appease the Russians.” In response to this direct question, Churchill had to give assurances that the British would be obliged to deploy all possible forces against the Germans when Operation Overlord began.

    In the end, the British plan for military operations in the eastern Mediterranean was rejected and the most important decision was approved to open a second front in Western Europe in May 1944 (“Overlord”). At one of the last plenary sessions of the Tehran Conference, A. Brooke read to the audience the decision unanimously adopted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the start of Operation Overlord would take place during May and that it would be supported by an operation in Southern France. The scale of the latter depended on the number of landing craft that the Allies would have had available by that time.

    Wanting to help implement the Overlord plan, the Soviet delegation announced that the Soviet armed forces would launch an offensive simultaneously with the Allied landings in France. “In order to prevent the Germans from maneuvering their reserves and transferring any significant forces from the eastern front to the west,” said the head of the Soviet delegation at the conference, “the Russians undertake by May to organize a large offensive against the Germans in several places in order to pin down the German divisions on the eastern front and not give the Germans the opportunity to create any difficulties for Overlord.” This statement was greeted with approval and gratitude by other conference participants.

    The governments of England and the United States also assumed obligations regarding the size of the invasion army, defining it at 35 divisions. At the insistence of the Soviet delegation, the president and prime minister agreed to quickly resolve the issue of the commander-in-chief of Operation Overlord, so that the allies would soon begin practical preparations for the landing.

    In a declaration issued after the Tehran Conference, the leaders of the three powers said that they had agreed on plans for the destruction of the German armed forces and had "come to full agreement as to the extent and timing of the operations to be undertaken from the east, west and south."

    It is difficult to overestimate the significance of the decisions on coordinated operations, on the opening of a second front in Western Europe and the rejection of Churchill’s various “Balkan options”. Commenting on the military decision of the Tehran Conference, the Izvestia newspaper wrote on December 7, 1943: “This decision is the greatest triumph of the principle of a coordinated coalition strategy against a common enemy. The implementation of such a principle has at all times been considered the most difficult among all the tasks put forward by waging a joint war. Now the Allied military headquarters have developed plans for decisive operations, coordinated them among themselves in terms of volumes and timing, and received the sanction of the leaders of the three powers, who approved these plans and timing.”

    At the first meeting of the conference, commenting on Roosevelt’s statement regarding the war in the Pacific, Stalin made an important statement: “We, Russians, welcome the successes that have been and are being achieved by the Anglo-American troops in the Pacific. Unfortunately, we cannot yet join our efforts to those of our Anglo-American friends because our forces are busy in the west and we do not have enough strength for any operations against Japan. Our forces in the Far East are more or less sufficient only to conduct defense, but for offensive operations these forces must be increased at least three times. This may be the case when we force Germany to capitulate. Then – a common front against Japan.” The head of the Soviet government confirmed the intention of the Soviet Union to actively participate in military operations in the Far East and its determination to declare war on Japan on the eve of the closing of the conference.

    The announcement of this intention was met with great satisfaction by the other participants. Churchill called Stalin's statement historical. It testified to the determination of the Soviet Union, in close cooperation with other states of the anti-fascist coalition, to achieve the elimination of the main centers of the Second World War and the establishment of a strong and lasting peace both in Europe and in the Far East.

    When discussing military issues at the conference, the British delegation, as already noted, repeatedly raised the issue of Turkey's entry into the war. The background of England's position is revealed with the utmost clarity in a Foreign Office document, which states that "Turkey's entry into the war would be the best, if not the only, means of keeping the Russians from establishing control of the Balkans... If the Turks remained neutral, British forces would not be able to “Apparently, to get to the Balkans before the Germans leave there, or before the Russians establish themselves there.”

    During the conference, it became clear that if Turkey entered the war, the allies would divert part of their forces from conducting main military operations, which would lead to another delay in the opening of a second front. The Soviet Union was against such a delay. Therefore, the Soviet delegation pointed out that the planning of all other military operations should not interfere with the main operation, but, on the contrary, facilitate it in every possible way. This fully applied to military actions related to ensuring Turkey’s entry into the war.

    In view of the positive decision by the conference on the main issue - the opening of a second front in Western Europe - the Soviet delegation agreed to include in the military decisions of the Tehran Conference an agreement on the desirability, from a military point of view, of Turkey entering the war on the side of the Allies before the end of 1943. At the conference, an agreement was also reached to send an invitation to the President of Turkey to arrive in Cairo in early December 1943 for negotiations with Roosevelt and Churchill.

    As part of the discussion of military issues, Roosevelt handed over memoranda to Stalin in Tehran, which raised the question of the possibility of the US armed forces using Soviet naval and air bases. At the same time, the American president requested that the US military mission in Moscow be urgently provided with the necessary information regarding airfields, housing, supplies, communications and meteorological conditions in the Primorsky Territory. The question raised by the Americans was not resolved at the Tehran Conference. The Soviet side showed justifiable caution in this matter so as not to give rise to new provocations on the Japanese side.

    As for the question of the Americans using air bases in the Soviet Union for end-to-end bombing of Germany, also raised at the Tehran Conference by the US delegation, the Soviet government soon after the conference agreed to this American request. A note from the USSR government dated December 25, 1943 stated that “on the Soviet side, in principle, there are no objections to the provision of air bases on the territory of the USSR for American military aircraft for the purpose of carrying out end-to-end bombing of Germany.” The appropriate Soviet military authorities were instructed to begin negotiations on this issue with United States military representatives in Moscow.

    Numerous international issues were also discussed at the Tehran Conference. The most important of them were: the creation of the United Nations, the future of Germany and the Polish question. The discussion of these key issues of the post-war world order was of particular importance, as it laid the foundation for subsequent decisions on them.

    The American President showed particular interest in the issue of creating a future international security organization. Conference participant A. Harriman notes in his memoirs that “Roosevelt’s main political goal in Tehran was to achieve Stalin’s consent to the creation of the United Nations at the end of the war.”

    During a conversation with Stalin, Roosevelt drew a diagram of this organization, from which it followed that the international organization would, in the opinion of the United States, consist of three main bodies. One of these bodies should be an Assembly, which would include all the United Nations. The Assembly "would meet in different places at specific times to discuss the problems of the world and make recommendations for their solution."

    The second body of the future international organization was to be the Executive Committee consisting of the USSR, the USA, England and China, two European countries, one Latin American, one Middle Eastern, one Far Eastern and one of the British dominions. This Executive Committee would have as its task the consideration of all non-military issues - economic, food, health issues, etc.

    Roosevelt failed to give a clear answer to the question about the nature of the decisions made by the said Executive Committee.

    The president called the third body of the future international organization a “police committee” consisting of representatives of the USSR, USA, England and China. This body was to be a coercive body that would have the power to take immediate action against a threat to the peace or in the event of a state of emergency.

    At the conference itself, Roosevelt did not speak out definitely about the procedure for making certain decisions by the great powers - the main participants in the future international organization. However, in a conversation with his son, he stated his point of view on this issue more clearly. He said: “...The world depends to such an extent on the unity of action of these three states (USSR, USA and England. - V.I.), that in important matters the negative position of at least one of them will have to veto the “controversial proposal as a whole.” “Father said,” recalls Elliott Roosevelt, “that the question of the veto was still subject to careful discussion, but that, generally speaking, he supported the principle, given the undeniable need to maintain the unity of the Troika in the future.”

    Roosevelt's ideas regarding the future international organization, expressed in Tehran, were not much different from what the president said to his other interlocutors, in particular Eden in March 1943. The main difference was that now we were talking about “four policemen,” whereas previously the United States believed that the main responsibility for “order in the world” should lie in the hands of two powers - the United States and England.

    Stalin listened with interest to Roosevelt's explanations and generally supported the idea of ​​​​creating an international organization to preserve peace and security. He called the scheme outlined by the president good and at the same time expressed the opinion on the advisability of creating not one, but two organizations: one European, and the second Far Eastern or, perhaps, world. These considerations testified, in particular, to the special importance that the Soviet Union has always attached to ensuring peace in Europe and European cooperation. The Soviet side paid great attention to preventing new aggression from Germany and Japan. “In order to prevent aggression,” Stalin told Roosevelt, “the bodies that are planned to be created will not be enough. It is necessary to be able to occupy the most important strategic points so that Germany cannot capture them. Such points need to be occupied not only in Europe, but also in the Far East so that Japan cannot start a new aggression.”

    The issue of establishing control over strategic points in order to “prevent a new big war” was considered at a meeting of foreign ministers on November 30. As a result of discussing this issue, the meeting participants came to the conclusion that it was necessary to establish control by the United Nations over the German and Japanese bases, which were used by the aggressors to attack and start a war.

    Although no further in-depth discussion of the issue of a future international organization took place at the conference, the heads of the three governments nevertheless came to a consensus on the advisability of creating one world international organization to preserve peace and security.

    The conference participants exchanged views on the future of Germany. This issue occupied a special place in the allied plans for the post-war world order. The fate of Europe and the whole world largely depended on his decision. The unleashing of two world wars by German imperialism within the lifetime of one generation raised with particular urgency the question of creating conditions that would exclude the possibility of new German aggression. At the conference, essentially two approaches to solving the problem collided: one - Anglo-American, aimed at splitting and dismembering Germany, and the other - Soviet, which had as its goal the elimination of German militarism, fascism and the creation of conditions for the democratic development of peace-loving Germany.

    The head of the Soviet government, in a conversation with the US President on November 29, said that in 15-20 years Germany would be able to regain its strength and start a new war if nothing restrained it. To prevent this, said I.V. Stalin and the allies must create a strong body that will have the right to occupy strategically important points. In the event of a threat of aggression from Germany, these points must be immediately occupied in order to surround Germany and suppress it. Roosevelt replied that he completely agreed with this opinion. The British Prime Minister considered it the duty of the USA, England and the USSR to ensure security in the world for at least 50 years by disarming Germany, preventing rearmament, establishing control over German enterprises, banning aviation and through far-reaching territorial changes.

    At the Tehran Conference, the American and British delegations outlined their plans for the dismemberment of Germany. On the last day of the conference, Roosevelt put forward a proposal to divide Germany into five autonomous states: 1) Prussia, reduced in size; 2) Hanover and the northwestern part of Germany; 3) Saxony and the Leipzig region; 4) Hesse-Darmstadt, Hesse-Kassel and the area south of the Rhine; 5) Bavaria, Baden and Württemberg. In addition, Hamburg, the Kiel Canal, the Ruhr region and the Saarland were proposed to be placed under international control. The American plan for the post-war organization of Germany was based on the preservation and strengthening of ties between American and German monopolies on terms favorable to the American financial oligarchy, which had become rich in the war.

    The British government also supported the dismemberment of Germany. The basis of Churchill's plans, however, was the idea not of American, but of English domination in Germany. The English ruling circles hoped to bring the Ruhr industry under their control and, relying on it, to occupy a dominant position in Europe. In order to weaken Germany, Churchill proposed isolating Prussia, seizing Bavaria and a number of other southern German lands, uniting them with some Central European countries into the Danube Confederation.

    The Soviet Union's approach to the German problem was fundamentally different from the American and British plans for the dismemberment of Germany. From the very first days of the war, the Soviet Union declared its task not to destroy the German state and people in general, but to liquidate the Hitlerite state and his army, and severely punish their leaders. This same line was pursued by the Soviet delegation at the Tehran Conference. Both during bilateral conversations with Roosevelt and Churchill, and at conference meetings, Stalin emphasized the need to create conditions that would exclude the possibility of a repetition of German aggression. In this regard, he spoke about the need for severe punishment of war criminals, the creation of strategic allied bases in Europe to take the necessary military measures to prevent German aggression, further strengthening the front of anti-fascist states, etc.

    As for the plans for the dismemberment of Germany outlined by Roosevelt and Churchill, Stalin had serious doubts about this. After Churchill’s speech at one of the meetings, the head of the Soviet delegation directly said that he did not like the English plan for the dismemberment of Germany. As a result, no decision was made on the German question at the conference; it was referred for further consideration to the European Advisory Commission.

    The Polish question was discussed in Tehran mainly between the Soviet and British delegations. The Americans generally expressed solidarity with the British, but did not show much activity on this issue. Roosevelt, in a conversation with Stalin, directly admitted that for him the Polish question was important mainly from the point of view of the election campaign in the United States. “There are six or seven million citizens of Polish origin in America,” he said, “and therefore, being a practical man, I would not like to lose their votes.”

    Shortly before the conference, the governments of England and the United States made an attempt to restore relations between the USSR and the Polish émigré government. And on the eve of the conference itself, they stocked up on additional arguments from the said government, which was supposed to serve as a “guideline” for Roosevelt and Churchill in determining their position on the Polish issue in Tehran.

    These are the “guidelines” outlined by the authors of these documents: the need for “constant vigilance regarding Soviet influence, which is becoming increasingly increasing in the allied. countries”, the reluctance of the Polish government to enter into any discussions on the issue of borders, preparation of “political action against the USSR” in the event that Soviet-Polish relations have not been restored by the time Soviet troops enter Polish territory, etc. In one of the documents, the Polish émigré government informed London and Washington that the uprising in Poland against Germany was planned to be carried out in mutual agreement with England and the United States either on the eve or at the very moment when Soviet troops entered Poland.

    Despite this openly anti-Soviet position of the Polish emigration, Roosevelt, at the beginning of the discussion of the Polish problem at the Tehran Conference, expressed the hope “that the Soviet government will be able to begin negotiations and restore its relations with the Polish government.” Churchill expressed similar hopes. In response to this, the Soviet delegation emphasized the special interest of the USSR in having friendly relations with Poland, because this is related to the security of the western borders of the Soviet Union. At the same time, the Soviet delegation again pointed out the hostile position taken by Polish emigrants towards the Soviet Union, and the subversive activities of the Polish underground reaction, which causes considerable damage to both the Soviet Union and the liberation movement of the Polish people.

    The Soviet government confirmed its desire to see Poland as an independent, democratic and strong state and its desire to develop friendly relations with it. “We are for the restoration, for the strengthening of Poland,” Stalin said at the conference. It was, however, quite obvious that the policy of the émigré Polish government excluded the possibility of developing such relations.

    When discussing the Polish problem, the main attention was paid to the question of the borders of Poland. The position of the Soviet delegation on this issue boiled down to providing the Polish people with fair, historically justified borders, which would be the borders of peace with the states neighboring Poland.

    At a meeting on December 1, Stalin explained that the Soviet position on this issue was that “Ukrainian lands should go to Ukraine, and Belarusian lands to Belarus,” that is, the 1939 border should exist between the USSR and Poland. The Soviet government, he said, “stands at the point of view of this border and considers it correct.” For the same reason, the Soviet Union considered it fair to return Poland to its ancestral lands in the west.

    For his part, Churchill explained to Stalin his position on the issue of Polish borders. During a conversation after dinner given by the USSR delegation in honor of the US and British delegations, the English Prime Minister showed in three matches how he imagined the borders between the USSR, Poland and Germany after the war. With one match he designated Germany, another – Poland and the third – the Soviet Union. According to Churchill, all three matches should be moved to the west in order to ensure the protection of the borders of the USSR. The head of the British delegation made a proposal according to which “the hearth of the Polish state and people should be located between the so-called Curzon line and the line of the Oder River, with the inclusion of East Prussia and the Oppeln province in Poland.”

    In response to this, Stalin pointed out that the Soviet Union did not have ice-free ports in the Baltic Sea. Therefore, he would need the ice-free ports of Konigsberg and Memel and the corresponding part of the territory of East Prussia.

    England and the USA agreed in principle to satisfy the Soviet wish. In a message to Stalin received in Moscow on February 27, 1944, Churchill indicated that the British government considered the transfer of Koenigsberg and the surrounding territory to the USSR “a fair claim on the part of Russia... The land of this part of East Prussia is stained with Russian blood, generously shed for a common cause... Therefore... the Russians have a historical and well-founded claim to this German territory."

    Churchill's agreement with changes in Poland's borders was explained by a number of reasons. Firstly, the British government sought to reach an agreement on this issue before the Red Army began to liberate Poland from the Nazi invaders. Eden admits this in his memoirs, noting that “if these questions (about the borders of Poland. - V.I.) would have remained unresolved until the entry of Soviet troops into Poland, it would have been even more difficult to resolve the Soviet-Polish problems.” Another reason for the British position was the hope that in the post-war period the power of pro-Western, anti-socialist forces would be established in Poland, that the “Curzon Line” would be the border of the two systems. Finally, the transfer of part of East Prussia to the Soviet Union fit into the framework of plans to weaken the German state, which was advocated in Tehran by both Roosevelt and Churchill.

    The leaders of the three powers also considered other issues. They adopted a declaration on Iran, which stated their “desire to preserve the full independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran.” The Soviet delegation informed its allies about the peace probe undertaken by the Finnish government in the summer and autumn of 1943. An exchange of views took place regarding the transfer of part of the Italian fleet to the Soviet Union and on a number of other issues.

    On the evening of December 1, the last, fourth plenary meeting of the Tehran Conference ended. The next day, its participants began to leave.

    The Tehran Conference occupies a special place in the history of international relations, foreign policy and diplomacy of the Soviet Union. This was the first conference of the leaders of the three leading powers of the anti-fascist coalition - the USSR, the USA and England, during which a number of the most important issues of the war and the post-war world order were discussed. For the first time in history, the anti-Hitler coalition agreed on a coalition strategy against a common enemy. This contributed to the adoption of joint decisions, the most important of which was the approval of Operation Overlord - the opening of a second front in Europe.

    The decisions of the Tehran Conference were imbued with optimism and faith in victory. This was one of the most characteristic features of the conference. Closing the conference, Roosevelt stated: “Our customs, philosophies and ways of life are different from each other. Each of us develops our own scheme of action in accordance with the desires and ideas of our peoples.

    However, here in Tehran we have proven that the different ideals of our countries can walk together as a harmonious whole, moving forward together for the common good of our countries and the world."

    The meeting in Tehran had a very positive impact on inter-allied relations. Cooperation between the USSR, the USA and England strengthened and expanded in many areas. For example, in December 1943, an agreement was reached between the Soviet and American governments on the exchange of information, which contributed to the expansion of political and cultural ties between the two states. Contacts between the military bodies of the Allied powers also expanded.

    The first meeting of the leaders of the three allied powers evoked extremely favorable comments in the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition, among all fighters against Hitler's tyranny. Its results were highly praised in the report of the head of the Soviet government on the 27th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Reporting on the reaction of official and diplomatic circles in Washington to the results of the Tehran Conference, USSR Ambassador to the USA A.A. Gromyko wrote that “the achievement of unity on the issue of military operations in Germany is emphasized as a fact of primary importance” and that, in the opinion of members of the delegation who returned from Tehran, “the agreement was easily reached due to the fact that the USSR clearly continues its policy, excluding the desire for territorial seizures."

    The importance of the Tehran Conference lay in the fact that it showed the futility of fascist diplomacy’s calculations for a split among the allies.

    The meeting in Tehran was also the first international conference in which the top leadership of the Soviet state took part. The successes of the Soviet armed forces on the fronts of the Second World War, as well as the consistent and persistent struggle of Soviet diplomacy to strengthen the anti-Hitler coalition, favored the implementation of the line of the Soviet delegation at the conference, aimed at making decisions that would shorten the duration of the war.

    At the conference, the head of the Soviet government met the President of the United States. Roosevelt was satisfied with his conversations with Stalin, which he later told his circle about. And Stalin showed interest in meetings with the American president, his approach to issues of war and peace. Harriman recalled in his memoirs: “When the president spoke, Stalin listened attentively and with great respect. At the same time, he could not hesitate to interrupt Churchill or make fun of him when the opportunity presented itself.”

    The head of the Soviet government, of course, remembered that President Roosevelt played a personal role in establishing diplomatic relations between the USSR and the USA in 1933. It was also important that during the Tehran Conference the similarity of the positions of the Soviet and American governments on the issue of military operations for 1944 was revealed.

    Throughout the conference, Churchill sought to pursue a joint Anglo-American line. At the same time, he made a lot of efforts to achieve support for his approach, in particular on issues of military strategy, from the Soviet delegation. Here he even attempted to discredit the Americans. Thus, in one of his conversations with Stalin, Churchill, although he assured his interlocutor that he “has great love for the Americans” and “does not want to humiliate them,” nevertheless sought to create the impression of the incompetence of the American leadership in matters of strategy.

    The discussion of issues at the Tehran Conference did not always go smoothly; things sometimes reached heated polemics, heated political discussions and disputes, and some issues remained unresolved. But that was not the main thing. The Tehran Conference went down in the history of international relations as evidence of the determination of the USSR, the USA and England to continue and develop cooperation between the states united in the anti-fascist coalition in order to defeat the common enemy.

    From the book World War II by Beevor Anthony

    Chapter 33 Ukraine and the Tehran Conference September–December 1943 The day of August 23, 1943, when Kharkov was finally liberated from the Germans, marked the beginning of a turning point in military operations on the southern sector of the Eastern Front. Soviet troops broke through the German defenses along

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    Tehran Conference After a many-hour flight, President Roosevelt found himself at the location of the Soviet Army for the first time in his life. The “sacred cow” landed at a Soviet airfield a few kilometers from Tehran, “in a huge plain, with Tehran and snowy

    From the book 500 famous historical events author Karnatsevich Vladislav Leonidovich

    TEHRAN CONFERENCE In 1943, an obvious turning point occurred in the war. The victories of the Red Army at Stalingrad and Kursk made it possible to seize the initiative on the Eastern Front. Rommel's troops were defeated in Africa. In July 1943, Anglo-American troops landed on

    From the book History of the Second World War. Blitzkrieg author Tippelskirch Kurt von

    7. The Tehran Conference and the military situation at the end of 1943. Negotiations in Cairo in November 1943 between Roosevelt and Churchill were simultaneously preparations for the Tehran Conference with the participation of Stalin, held from November 28 to December 3. Favorable course of events

    author

    Chapter Four Tehran Conference: The Red Army becomes the land army of the Anglo-Saxon world Relations between the USSR and the USA by September 1943 had deteriorated as much as was possible between allies waging war against a common enemy, in many ways

    From the book “Cannon Fodder” by Churchill author Usovsky Alexander Valerievich

    Tehran Conference. November 28 - December 1, 1943 Three Power Declaration We, the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain and the Premier of the Soviet Union, have met for the past four days in the capital of our ally Iran and formulated

    From the book “Cannon Fodder” by Churchill author Usovsky Alexander Valerievich

    Tehran Conference. November 28 – December 1, 1943 Recording of conversation between I.V. Stalin with F. Roosevelt during dinner with the US President. On November 28, 1943, Stalin told Roosevelt that the demand for unconditional surrender on the part of the allies was inciting people in enemy areas.

    From the book the Secret becomes clear author Volkov Fedor Dmitrievich

    Chapter VII Tehran Meeting The ancient eastern city of Tehran, the capital of Iran, is located on a treeless hill on the southern slope of the low Elburz mountains. In the center of the city is an ancient citadel with the Shah's palace. From it, like the rays of the sun, abundantly warming

    From the book The Defeat of Fascism. USSR and Anglo-American allies in World War II author Olsztynsky Lennor Ivanovich

    3.1. Changing policies and strategic plans of the allies The Tehran Conference and its decisions The completion of a radical change on the Soviet-German front showed that the USSR was capable of completely defeating Germany on its own. However, the continuation of the confrontation with

    From the book History of the Soviet Union: Volume 2. From the Patriotic War to the position of the second world power. Stalin and Khrushchev. 1941 - 1964 by Boffa Giuseppe

    Potsdam Conference The last conference of the senior leaders of the anti-fascist coalition, which met in Potsdam, was also the longest: it lasted from July 17 to August 2. In its character it was very different from the previous ones: Tehran and Yalta. Others

    From the book Diplomacy during the war years (1941–1945) author Israelyan Viktor Levonovich

    Tehran Conference Having completed negotiations in Cairo, Roosevelt and Churchill went to Tehran, where they met with the Soviet delegation headed by Stalin. For four days - from November 28 to December 1, 1943 - the heads of government of the USSR, USA and England exchanged

    Tehran Conference- the first conference of the “Big Three” during the Second World War - the leaders of three countries: F. D. Roosevelt (USA), W. Churchill (Great Britain) and J. V. Stalin (USSR), held in Tehran on November 28 - December 1 1943.

    The historical significance of the conference can hardly be overestimated - it was the first meeting of the Big Three, at which the fate of millions of people and the future of the world were decided.

    Conference goals:

    The conference was called upon to develop a final strategy for the fight against Germany and its allies. The conference became an important stage in the development of international and inter-allied relations; a number of issues of war and peace were considered and resolved at it:

    • an exact date was set for the Allies to open a second front in France (and the “Balkan strategy” proposed by Great Britain was rejected),
    • discussed issues of granting independence to Iran (“Declaration on Iran”)
    • the beginning of the solution to the Polish question was laid
    • about the beginning of the USSR war with Japan after the defeat of Nazi Germany
    • the contours of the post-war world order were outlined
    • a unity of views has been achieved on issues of ensuring international security and lasting peace

    Tehran Conference (1943) Franklin Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill
    Yalta Conference (1945) Franklin Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill
    Potsdam Conference (1945) Harry Truman, Stalin and Churchill
    In 1943, in Tehran, Franklin Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill discussed mainly the problem of achieving victory over the Third Reich; in Potsdam in July-August 1945, the allies resolved issues of peaceful settlement and division of Germany; in Yalta, major decisions were made on the future division of the world between countries -winners.

    47. USSR in the post-war years: restoration and development of the national economy and social life.

    With the end of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet people had to do a huge amount of work to restore the economy, raise the material standard of living of people, and begin peaceful creative work.

    Measures were taken aimed at resuming normal work in enterprises and institutions. Mandatory overtime work was abolished, the 8-hour working day and annual paid leave were restored. The state budget for the third and fourth quarters of 1945 and for 1946 was revised. Appropriations for military needs were reduced and expenditures for the development of civilian sectors of the economy increased. In August 1945, the USSR State Planning Committee received the task of preparing a draft plan for the restoration and development of the national economy.

    The restructuring of the national economy and social life in relation to peacetime conditions was completed mainly in 1946.

    In March 1946, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR approved a plan for the restoration and development of the national economy for 1946-1950. It defined

    ways of revival and further development of the economy. The main objective of the five-year plan was to restore the areas

    countries subject to occupation to achieve the pre-war level of industrial development and agriculture and then surpass them

    (by 48 and 23%, respectively). The plan provided for the priority development of heavy and defense industries. Significant financial resources, material and labor resources were allocated here. It was planned to develop new coal regions and expand the metallurgical base in the east of the country. One of the conditions for fulfilling planned targets was the maximum use of the achievements of scientific and technological progress.

    Enterprises were equipped with new technology. The mechanization of labor-intensive processes in the iron and steel and coal industries has increased. Electrification of production continued. By the end of the Five-Year Plan, the electrical output of labor in industry was one and a half times higher than the 1940 level.

    The end of the Great Patriotic War had a significant impact on the socio-political development of society. Over the course of three and a half years, about 8.5 million former soldiers were demobilized from the army and returned to civilian life. Over 4 million repatriates returned to their homeland - prisoners of war, residents of occupied areas driven into captivity, and some emigrants.

    Having endured the incredible hardships of wartime, the population expected improved working and living conditions, positive changes in society,

    softening of the political regime. As in previous years, for the majority these hopes were associated with the name of I.V. Stalin. Upon completion

    war I.V. Stalin was relieved of his duties as People's Commissar of Defense, but retained the post of Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. He continued

    remain a member of the Politburo and the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party of the Soviet Union). The authority of I.V., which increased during the war years. Stalin was supported by the entire system of the administrative-bureaucratic and ideological apparatus. In 1946-1947 on behalf of I.V. Stalin, projects were being developed

    the new Constitution of the USSR and the VKShchb Program). The constitutional project provided for some development of democratic principles in the life of society. Thus, simultaneously with the recognition of the state form of ownership as the dominant one, the existence of small peasant farming based on personal labor was allowed. During the discussion of the draft Constitution in the republican party and economic structures, wishes were expressed for the decentralization of economic life. Proposals were made to expand the economic independence of local management organizations. It was proposed to supplement the draft Program of the VKShchb with a provision on limiting the terms of elective party work, etc. However, all proposals were rejected, and subsequently work on the draft documents ceased. The population's expectations for changes for the better were not destined to come true. Soon after the end of the war, the country's leadership took measures to tighten its internal political course.

    48. The world and the USSR in a state of “cold war”: the main directions of foreign policy in the post-war years.

    Changes in the international arena. The foreign policy activities of the Soviet state in the second half of the 40s took place in an atmosphere of profound changes in the international arena. Victory in the Patriotic War increased the authority of the USSR. In 1945, it had diplomatic relations with 52 states (compared to 26 in the pre-war years). The Soviet Union took an active part in resolving the most important international issues, and above all in resolving the post-war situation in Europe.
    In seven countries of Central and Eastern Europe, leftist, democratic forces came to power. The new governments created in them were headed by representatives of the communist and workers' parties. Leaders of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania. Poland, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia carried out agrarian reforms in their countries, nationalization of large industry, banks and transport. The established political organization of society was called people's democracy. It was seen as one of the forms of proletarian dictatorship.
    In 1947, at a meeting of representatives of nine communist parties of Eastern European countries, the Communist Information Bureau (Cominformburo) was created. He was entrusted with coordinating the actions of the communist parties of the people's democracies, which began to call themselves socialist. The documents of the meeting formulated the thesis about dividing the world into two camps - imperialist and democratic, anti-imperialist. The concept of two camps, of confrontation on the world stage between two social systems lay at the heart of the foreign policy views of the party and state leadership of the USSR. These views were reflected, in particular, in the work of J.V. Stalin “Economic problems of socialism in the USSR.” The work also contained the conclusion about the inevitability of wars in the world as long as imperialism exists.
    Treaties of friendship and mutual assistance were concluded between the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe. Identical treaties linked the Soviet Union with the GDR, created on the territory of East Germany, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the People's Republic of China (PRC). The agreement with China provided for a loan of $300 million. The right of the USSR and China to use the former CER was confirmed. The countries reached an agreement on joint actions in the event of aggression by any of the states. Diplomatic relations were established with states that gained independence as a result of the national liberation struggle that unfolded in them (the so-called developing countries).
    The beginning of the Cold War. With the end of the Patriotic War, changes occurred in the relationship of the USSR with its former allies in the anti-Hitler coalition. “Cold War” - this is the name given to the foreign policy pursued by both sides towards each other during the second half of the 40s - the early 90s. It was characterized primarily by hostile political actions of the parties. Forceful methods were used to solve international problems. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USSR in the initial period of the Cold War were V. M. Molotov, and since 1949 - A. Ya. Vyshinsky.
    The confrontation between the parties clearly manifested itself in 1947 in connection with the Marshall Plan put forward by the United States. The program developed by US Secretary of State J. Marshall provided for the provision of economic assistance to European countries that suffered during the Second World War. The USSR and people's democracies were invited to participate in a conference on this matter. The Soviet government regarded the Marshall Plan as a weapon of anti-Soviet policy and refused to participate in the conference. At his insistence, the countries of Eastern Europe invited to the conference also announced their refusal to participate in the Marshall Plan.
    One of the forms of manifestation of the Cold War was the formation of political and military-political blocs. In 1949, the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) was created. It included the USA, Canada and several Western European countries. Two years later, the military-political alliance between the United States, Australia and New Zealand (ANZUS) was signed. The formation of these blocs contributed to the strengthening of the US position in different regions of the world.
    In the context of intensifying confrontation in relations between former allies, the Soviet Union worked against the propaganda of a new war. The main arena of his activities was the United Nations (UN). This international organization was created in 1945. It united 51 states. Its goal was to strengthen peace and security and develop cooperation between states. At UN sessions, Soviet representatives made proposals to reduce conventional weapons and ban atomic weapons, and to withdraw foreign troops from the territories of foreign states. All these proposals, as a rule, were blocked by US representatives and their allies. The USSR unilaterally withdrew troops from the territories of several states where they had been deployed during the war years.
    Representatives of Soviet public organizations actively participated in the peace movement, which took organizational form in the late 40s. More than 115 million citizens of the country signed the Stockholm Appeal adopted by the Standing Committee of the World Peace Congress (1950). It contained demands for the prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of international control over the implementation of this decision.
    The confrontation between the former allies reached its greatest intensity at the turn of the 40s and 50s in connection with the Korean War. In 1950, the leadership of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea made an attempt to unite the two Korean states under its leadership. According to Soviet leaders, this association could strengthen the position of the anti-imperialist camp in this region of Asia. During the preparation for the war and during hostilities, the USSR government provided financial, military and technical assistance to North Korea. The PRC leadership, at the insistence of J.V. Stalin, sent several military divisions to North Korea to participate in combat operations. The war was ended only in 1953 after lengthy diplomatic negotiations.
    USSR and Eastern European countries. One of the leading directions of foreign policy in the post-war years was the establishment of friendly relations with the states of Eastern Europe. Soviet diplomacy provided assistance to Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania in the preparation of peace treaties with them (signed in Paris in 1947). In accordance with trade agreements, the Soviet Union supplied grain, raw materials for industry, and fertilizers for agriculture to Eastern European countries on preferential terms. In 1949, in order to expand economic cooperation and trade between countries, an intergovernmental economic organization was created - the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). It included Albania (until 1961), Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and since 1949 the GDR. The seat of the CMEA Secretariat was Moscow. One of the reasons for the creation of CMEA was the boycott by Western countries of trade relations with the USSR and the states of Eastern Europe.
    The main directions of relations between the USSR and Eastern European countries were determined by bilateral agreements between them. Military and other types of assistance were provided in case one of the parties became involved in hostilities. It was planned to develop economic and cultural ties and hold conferences on international issues affecting the interests of the contracting parties.
    Already on initial stage During the period of cooperation between the USSR and the states of Eastern Europe, contradictions and conflicts appeared in their relations. They were mainly associated with the search and choice of the path to building socialism in these states. According to the leaders of some countries, in particular W. Gomulka (Poland) and K. Gottwald (Czechoslovakia), the Soviet path of development was not the only one for building socialism. The desire of the USSR leadership to establish the Soviet model of building socialism and to unify ideological and political concepts led to the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict. The reason for it was Yugoslavia’s refusal to participate in the federation with Bolshaya recommended by the Soviet leaders. In addition, the Yugoslav side refused to fulfill the terms of the agreement on mandatory consultations with the USSR on issues of national foreign policy. Yugoslav leaders were accused of retreating from joint actions with socialist countries. In August 1949, the USSR broke off diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia.

    The results of the USSR's foreign policy activities in the second half of the 40s and early 50s were contradictory. Its position in the international arena has strengthened. At the same time, the policy of confrontation between East and West significantly contributed to the growth of tension in the world.
    Difficulties in the economic sphere, ideologization of socio-political life, increased international tension - these were the results of the development of society in the first post-war years. During this period, the regime of personal power of I.V. Stalin became even stronger, and the command and administrative system became more stringent. During these same years, the idea of ​​the need for change in society became more and more clearly formed in the public consciousness. The death of J.V. Stalin (March 1953) facilitated the search for a way out of the contradictions that entangled all spheres of public life.

    49. Implementation of political and economic reforms in 1953-1964. Period of collective leadership. XX Congress of the CPSU. Reforms of N.S. Khrushchev in the field of agriculture and industrial management. Political loss of N.S. Khrushchev.

    Political reforms of N, Khrushchev

    After Malenkov’s removal, Khrushchev became the de facto head of state. The 20th Congress of the CPSU in February 1956 and N. Khrushchev’s speech at it on Stalin’s personality cult became a turning point in history, the beginning of partial de-Stalinization and democratization of the country’s life. The report cited examples of the lawlessness of the Stalinist regime, which were associated mainly only with the activities of certain specific individuals, but did not raise the question of the existence of a totalitarian system. This speech strengthened Khrushchev's authority, which caused discontent among other party leaders. In June 1957, at the Plenum of the Central Committee, Voroshilov and Kaganovich tried to remove Khrushchev from the leadership. But thanks to the support of party leaders, opposition representatives were condemned by the communists as an “anti-party group.” At the same Plenum, Khrushchev achieved the introduction of new persons into the Presidium of the Central Committee who supported him in difficult times - Brezhnev, Zhukov, Ignatov and others.

    Continuing his reformist line, Khrushchev managed to take radical steps in restructuring the ruling party. At the XXII Congress in October 1961, changes were made to the Charter of the CPSU, which concerned the democratization of the party itself, the conditions for admission to it, the expansion of the rights of local party organizations, and the expansion of the rights of union republics. In 1957, the rights of peoples deported under Stalin were restored; in the late 50s. various forms of public self-government began to emerge, etc.

    Economic reforms of N. Khrushchev (50s - mid-60s)

    Having achieved relative political stability through the course of some liberalization of the regime, Khrushchev was faced with intractable economic problems. It was decided to start reforms Withagriculture. It was planned to increase state purchase prices for collective farm products and expand sown areas to include virgin and fallow lands. The development of virgin lands initially provided an increase in food supply. On the other hand, it was carried out to the detriment not only of traditional grain-growing areas, but was not scientifically prepared. Therefore, "virgin lands soon fell into disrepair. In March 1955, reform of agricultural production planning began. The goal was declared to be a combination of centralized management of agriculture With expansion of rights and economic initiative at the local level, i.e. decentralization of government of the republics. Almost 15 thousand enterprises were transferred to the jurisdiction of republican administrative bodies. In 1957, the government began to abolish sectoral ministries and replace them with territorial government bodies. SNK (National Economic Councils) were created in the republics. The central apparatus for managing the national economy became the USSR Council of National Economy and the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR. At the end of 1962, one of the most unsuccessful reforms was carried out: party organizations were divided into industrial and rural.

    In development industry Much attention was paid to the development of light industry, the result was an increase in the gross output of the food industry by 1.5 times. A significant place in Khrushchev's overall strategy was given to scientific and technological progress in the development of heavy and light industry.

    Serious shortcomings of economic reforms were management miscalculations, increased spending on military needs, politicization and ideologization in managing the national economy. Such experiments as the so-called “Ryazan meat experiment”, “corn epic”, the eviction of agricultural scientists from Moscow to villages, etc. are widely known. The increase in crisis phenomena led to social destabilization (suppression of workers’ protests in Novocherkassk in 1962, dispersal of student demonstrations in 1958). In order to reduce tension, the authorities decided to increase wages in the public sector, double pensions, lower the retirement age, and reduce the working hours. The crisis of the management system was obvious, but Khrushchev laid all the blame on the rural party organizations. The situation was aggravated by the significant growth of the bureaucratic apparatus, mixing! functions, duplication of solutions, etc. The reform of the central apparatus for managing the national economy (the creation of economic councils) had the same consequences.

    Thus, Khrushchev’s economic and political reforms were limited in nature to democratization and. boiled down to a formal structural reorganization, which inevitably led to crisis phenomena. The crisis of reforms led to the emergence of conservative tendencies and the restoration of some elements of totalitarianism. Khrushchev's line of sole rule of the party and state apparatus was regarded by the party and state apparatus as a desire for a new dictatorship. As a result, in October 1964, at the Plenum of the Central Committee, Khrushchev was removed from his posts in the party and government.

    Officially, after Stalin's death, the so-called "collective leadership", the dictator's inner circle. On March 6, 1953, at a joint meeting of the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the following members of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee were approved: G. M. Malenkov (Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR), L. P. Beria (First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Minister Internal Affairs and State Security), V. M. Molotov (First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and Minister of Foreign Affairs), K. E. Voroshilov (Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR), N. A. Bulganin (First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR) , A. I. Mikoyan (Minister of Trade), M. V. Saburov (Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR) and M. G. Pervukhin (Minister of Power Plants and Electrical Industry).

    Great value in the beginning of liberalization of socio-political life had XX Congress of the CPSU(February 1956). The report on the work of the Party Central Committee and the directives of the sixth five-year plan for national economic development were discussed at the congress. Due to the sharply negative

    the position of V. M. Molotov, K. E. Voroshilov, L. M. Kaganovich and G. M. Malenkov, the question of Stalin was not raised.

    As a result of the compromise, the report “On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences” was read at a closed meeting of the congress (first published in 1989). The report contained information collected by P. N. Pospelov’s commission about the mass executions of innocent people and the deportation of peoples in the 30-40s. They talked about repression, torture, the death of prominent people, about V.I. Lenin’s letter to the congress and Stalin’s neglect of the collective leadership, about the difficult situation of agriculture, about the defeats of the Red Army at the initial stage of the war. Remaining captive to ideological dogmas, Khrushchev explained all these events solely by Stalin’s personal qualities. By limiting itself to criticism of the “cult of personality,” the new party leadership preserved the very system of socialist society intact and closed the path to a real restructuring of Soviet society for many years.

    The significance of this unprecedented step that Khrushchev decided to take was enormous. Having overthrown Stalin from his pedestal, Khrushchev at the same time removed the “halo of immunity” from the first person and his entourage in general. The system of total fear was largely destroyed. The seemingly unshakable faith in the infallibility of the supreme power was greatly shaken.

    The 20th Congress was the beginning of a critical rethinking of world socialist practice and the development of the international communist movement. The process begun by the 20th Congress subsequently led to a split in the almost monolithic (the only exceptions were the Communist Parties of Yugoslavia and a few Trotskyists) communist movement.

    Groups of parties were formed:

    1) admitting some of Stalin’s “mistakes” and focusing on the CPSU;

    2) those who do not recognize Stalin’s criticism and are oriented towards the Communist Party of China;

    50. USSR in the mid-1960s - first half of the 1980s. L.N. Brezhnev. Economic (Kosygin) reform of 1965. Increasing crisis phenomena in the economic, political and socio-spiritual spheres.

    Socio-economic development of the USSR. Mistakes made by N.S. Khrushchev, voluntarism in his policy facilitated the rise to power of conservative forces, which completely blocked the nascent democratic movement. October 14, 1964 at the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee N.S. Khrushchev was removed from all posts. L.I. became the first secretary (since 1966 - General Secretary) of the CPSU Central Committee. Brezhnev, who expressed the interests of the party apparatus and a powerful layer of the economic bureaucracy. Since 1977, he held another post - Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Therefore, the main factor that determined the internal life of the country in the mid-60s was the search for ways of further economic and social development. The largest attempt to rebuild the economy in the entire post-war period was the economic reform of 1965, carried out under the leadership of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A.N. Kosygina. The reform affected industry, construction, and agriculture. The industrial management reform was approved by the September (1965) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. Its main directions were: new administrative centralization: abolition of economic councils and restoration of industrial ministries (sectoral management); introduction of cost accounting at enterprises; changes in the industry and construction management system: reduction in the number of indicators planned from above; introduction as a core assessment; development

    economic stimulation of enterprises. Enterprises that switched to the new system generally improved their performance. Period 1966-1970 was the best in the last 30 years. The volume of industrial production increased by one and a half times. Subsequently, the extensive nature of the economy led to the accelerated development of the fuel and energy complex of the USSR. If in 1971-1975. it amounted to 11% of the total volume of capital investments, then in 1992 - 21%. In 1980, the complex provided 10% of world oil and gas production. With the coming to power of L.I. Brezhnev also increased funding for defense programs. 45% of the budget funds allocated to industry were spent annually on the needs of the military-industrial complex. The military-industrial sector accounted for 80% of machine-building plants. Against the backdrop of the global economy, management realized the need to transition to intensive production methods. From 1970 to 1985 the share of industries that determined scientific and technological progress in the national economy (mechanical engineering, metalworking, chemistry and petrochemistry, electric power) in gross output increased from 25% to 38% (while in industrialized countries their share reached 55-65% ). Along with the creation of scientific and production associations, new industries emerged - robotics, microelectronics, nuclear engineering, etc. But these trends did not become decisive for the development of the economy. The agricultural policy of the USSR was characterized by large investments in agriculture, exceeding 1/5 of all investments. Among the measures taken were the following: control over collective farms was weakened, prices for agricultural products were increased (on average by 20%), a firm government procurement plan was established for 6 years, and a 50% premium was introduced for above-plan production. In general, in 1960-1969. There was an increase in agricultural production. At the same time, the emphasis was on agro-industrial integration - the unification of agriculture with the industries that serve it. The created agroindustrial complexes, however, did not become viable economic organisms, turning into a purely administrative structure (the USSR State Agricultural Industry was created in 1985). Since the second half of the 70s, the situation in agriculture began to take on a crisis character. The growth rate of agricultural production in the first half of the 60s. were 4.3%, in the first half of the 80s - 1.4%. Most collective and state farms were unprofitable. The standard of living in the USSR slowly increased until the mid-70s, and then did not decline for more than five years. However, financing of the social sphere continued exclusively on a residual basis. Since 1970 The main economic indicators began to decline. By the end of the 70s, signs of a commodity famine emerged and the deficit increased. The growth rate of national income fell from 7.7% in the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1965-1970) to 3.8% in the Eleventh (1981-1985). Accordingly, the growth rate of labor productivity fell from 6.8% to 3%.

    Socio-political situation. Period 70's - early 80's. in the history of Soviet society received the definition of “stagnant”. The reasons for stagnation and crisis phenomena, along with the subjective factor (the personality of L.I. Brezhnev and his entourage), lay in the socio-economic relations that prevailed in the country, the model of society that was formed back in the 30s. In the new Constitution of the USSR in 1977, the party abandoned the idea of ​​a quick transition to communism and the withering away of the state. The modern political period was defined as “developed socialism.” The Constitution declared the creation of “a new social and international community - the Soviet people.” Its 6th article legally secured the monopoly position of the CPSU in the political system, and the party itself was defined as

    “the guiding and guiding force of Soviet society, the core of the political system.” From 1966 to 1985 the number of the CPSU increased from 12.4 to 19 million people. During the Brezhnev period, a process of further centralization of the party apparatus and strengthening of the power of the partyocracy took place. Phenomena such as corruption, criminalization, etc. completely undermined the authority of the authorities. The ideological dictate of the CPSU restrained the development of creativity and encouraged unanimity. There was a return to neo-Stalinism in ideology, literature, science, and culture. In society

    Social apathy was growing, caused by double standards and growing social injustice. The dissident movement continued to be a radical expression of disagreement with the existing situation in the country.

    Results. A characteristic feature of social production in those years was the preferential development of industries of group “A” compared to group “B” and the military-industrial complex. At the same time, the Soviet economy remained predominantly at the industrial stage, while the economies of a number of countries around the world rose to the scientific-industrial stage. The 1965 reform was replaced by counter-reforms that strengthened centralization and the position of the departmental bureaucracy. Soviet foreign policy for 1965-1985. also went through a difficult and contradictory path from harsh confrontation with the West to détente and from there to a new aggravation of international tension that brought the world to the brink of world war. It was based on the concepts of ideological confrontation and struggle between two systems. The Brezhnev leadership had two serious achievements: ensuring military-strategic parity with the United States and the policy of détente of the first early 70s. By the first half of the 80s, the USSR was drawn into another round of the arms race, which undermined the state of the Soviet economy.

    Kosygin reform- industrial reform 1965-1970, aimed at strengthening economic incentives and expanding the independence of enterprises. In September 1965, the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee was held, which adopted a resolution “On improving industrial management, improving planning and strengthening economic incentives.” On the initiative of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A.N. Kosygin, it was proposed to reform industrial enterprises in order to increase their efficiency. The reform, called “Kosygin”, provided for the introduction, along with gross indicators, of the cost of goods sold, the general wage fund, total amount centralized capital investments. To stimulate the activities of enterprises, part of the income had to remain in the enterprise. At the same time, the vertical of power was simultaneously strengthened, and central industrial ministries were restored instead of economic councils. Nevertheless, according to Academician L.I. Abalkin, in the country as a whole, according to all the most important socio-economic indicators, the period 1966-1970 was the best in all the years of Soviet power. But, as shown further development events, the reform was a set of disparate and contradictory steps, was carried out inconsistently, was hampered by local authorities, the expansion of independence was combined with the strengthening of the administrative and economic powers of the ministries. The party leaders felt a threat to their undivided power. By the mid-1970s, the reform was curtailed, a period of stagnation began, and the goals of the reform were not achieved.

    After abandoning the “Kosygin reform” exclusively administrative methods of management began to dominate again, and the same type of decisions were made year after year, which ultimately led to stagnation in the national economy. The country's fundamental economic growth indicators continued to deteriorate steadily.
    The arms race required an increase in the output of military products, which led to a certain militarization of the economic sphere. Military spending consumed up to 20% of the gross national product.
    The gap from Western countries in scientific and technological progress accumulated, and primarily in non-military sectors, and the number of officially registered inventions in the USSR was greater than in the USA, Japan, Great Britain, Germany and other countries. However, under the existing system they were largely not introduced into the socialist economy.
    The extensive raw materials-based nature of economic development continued to prevail. Since the second half of the 1960s. The unprecedented development of oil and gas fields in Siberia and the export of fuel abroad began. So-called “petrodollars” flowed into the country, which were used to patch up bottlenecks in the national economy. This process objectively increased the raw materials orientation of the domestic economy. The situation in the agricultural sector in the late 1970s. began to take on a catastrophic nature, so in 1982 agro-industrial complexes (APCs) were created. Collective farms, state farms, and enterprises for processing agricultural raw materials, located on the same territory, were united into regional agro-industrial complexes. However, over all the years of its existence, the agro-industrial complex has not justified itself, has not become a viable economic organism and has not fulfilled the food program.
    Political development of the USSR in 1965-1985. proceeded within the framework of the existing one under I.V. Stalin's political system with the dominant role of the Communist Party in society. The dictates of the party-state apparatus were all-encompassing and formed the core of the country's administrative and managerial system.
    In the political and ideological sphere, a return to hidden Stalinism gradually began. Name I.V. Stalin began to appear more and more often in memoirs, various books and articles. These memories were, as a rule, of an apologetic nature. A gradual drift began away from the decisions of the XX and XXII Party Congresses.
    An important milestone in political development was the adoption of the USSR Constitution in October 1977. Its main provisions were:
    - characteristics of the then stage of development of Soviet society, which received the official name “developed socialism”;
    - fixation of the national character of the state instead of the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat;
    - legislative consolidation of the leading role of the CPSU in society (Article 6) as the core of the political system;
    - the presence of a wide range of rights and freedoms of citizens, which were poorly implemented in real life.
    Another serious problem in the functioning of political-power relations was gerontocracy (“the power of the elders”). In the 1970s the average age of the top party leadership was approaching 70 years, and, despite physical ailments and illnesses, they continued to decide the destinies of the country. Their only goal was to preserve personal power, therefore, conservation of all spheres of life of Soviet society took place, and in this sense, the term “stagnation” that subsequently appeared quite accurately reflected the situation of this period of time.
    Since the mid-1960s. In our country, a dissident movement arose as a form of dissent in relation to the ideology and policies of the Soviet system, a form of public disagreement and protest.
    The authorities responded by intensifying repression against dissidents. Some of them were exiled abroad (A. Solzhenitsyn, V. Bukovsky, A. Galich, etc.), while others were convicted and were imprisoned (A. Marchenko, N. Sharansky, etc.). Academician A.D. Sakharov was isolated and exiled in 1980 to the then closed city of Gorky (Nizhny Novgorod), where he remained until 1986.
    Dissidents, according to today's estimates, undermined the totalitarian system and brought democracy closer to the country.
    Crisis phenomena also affected the social and spiritual spheres of society. There have been major changes in the social structure of the population. A privileged position was occupied by a group of leading officials, or party state nomenklatura. Its share in the social structure of Soviet society increased 2.4 times compared to the pre-war period and by 1979 amounted to 6%. In material terms, they were the most wealthy and enjoyed all sorts of privileges.
    Workers ranked first in terms of numerical strength (60% in 1979), but about half of them were employed in heavy and unskilled work. Negative influence their position was influenced by the equalizing nature of wages.
    The number of village residents, due to a number of reasons, decreased three times (15% in 1979) and the question arose acutely of who would work in the agricultural sector. The townspeople, mostly civil servants and intellectuals, were sent to harvest the harvest on a massive, forced basis.
    There was an increase in negative phenomena in the social sphere (drunkenness, corruption, etc.).
    In the spiritual sphere, there was a loss of moral guidelines. The suppression of dissent and all freedom, including religious freedom, continued. The people and the country were experiencing a stage of spiritual crisis.

    51. Main directions of foreign policy of the USSR in 1965-1985. "Brezhnev Doctrine". Events in Czechoslovakia 1968. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (1972-1975). Troop entry into Afghanistan 1979

    In the context of increasing nuclear potential in the world, one of the main directions of Soviet foreign policy was the struggle to achieve military-strategic parity between East and West. And although it was achieved in 1969, the Soviet leadership still considered the buildup of weapons and their improvement as component struggle for peace.

    The change in the foreign policy course of the Soviet state had a positive impact on relations with the West. Contacts with France expanded.

    One of the priority directions of Soviet foreign policy was relations with third world countries. In an effort to strengthen its influence in various regions of the planet, the USSR provided them with large-scale assistance. It covered the military, financial, technical and other spheres: military and civilian specialists were sent here, huge preferential loans were given, and cheap weapons and raw materials were supplied. Only for the first half of the 1970s. In the “liberated countries”, about 900 industrial enterprises were built with the help of the USSR. The USSR was particularly active in the Middle East (Syria), Africa (Egypt, Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique) and Southeast Asia (Laos, Cambodia). Thus, the USSR inspired the Cuban intervention in Angola, helped the Popular Liberation Front of Mozambique, and directly intervened in the conflict in the Horn of Africa, first on the side of Somalia and then on the side of Ethiopia. In 1979, through the mediation of Cuba, the USSR supported the partisans in Nicaragua, who achieved the overthrow of the pro-American regime of dictator Somoza in that country. The Soviet leadership was sympathetic to the countries that proclaimed a course towards building socialism. Such “help” led to the siphoning of colossal funds from the country’s national budget and became one of the reasons for its economic collapse.

    In the early 80s. The foreign policy of the USSR brought mostly disappointing results, erasing the successes of the period of detente.

    Brezhnev Doctrine- a description of the foreign policy of the USSR of the 60-80s formulated by Western politicians and public figures. The doctrine was that the USSR could interfere in the internal affairs of the countries of Central-Eastern Europe, which were part of the socialist bloc in order to ensure the stability of the political course, built on the basis of real socialism and aimed at close cooperation with the USSR.

    The doctrine remained in force until the late 1980s, when under Mikhail Gorbachev it was replaced by a different approach, which was jokingly called the “Sinatra Doctrine” (referring to Frank Sinatra’s song “My Way”).

    The actual end of the doctrine is attributed to the meeting between USSR President M. S. Gorbachev and US President George W. Bush in Malta in December 1989.

    In 1968 in Czechoslovakia the process of renewal began, the rejection of deformed socialism, which bore all the features of the Stalinist model. Re-forms were started by some of the leaders of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, led by A. Dubcek, under the slogan of building “socialism with a human face.” Initially, the Soviet leadership welcomed the Prague Spring. However, articles soon began to appear in the Soviet press expressing concerns whether the rapid process of renewal in Czechoslovakia would lead to the abandonment of socialist principles. The concepts of “pluralism” and “diversity of models of socialism”, widely used in the Czechoslovak press, which were regarded as a departure from the Soviet model, received a sharply negative assessment in propaganda. On August 21, 1968, units of the Soviet Army crossed the border of Czechoslovakia. Together with them there were parts of the GDR, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria. This was an aggressive action against a sovereign country.

    Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, OSCE) - the most representative regional organization, created to discuss critical issues international security in modern Europe. The OSCE arose as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe at the initiative of the USSR and socialist countries. The first round of the Meeting took place 1972–1975. and ended with the signing in Helsinki of the Final Act and the Declaration of Principles that should guide the signatory states international documents. The CSCE was created as a permanent forum of representatives European countries, the USA and Canada to develop measures to reduce military opposition and strengthen security in Europe.

    In early December 1979, the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, informed the leadership of the General Staff that in the near future a decision would probably be made to send up to 75 thousand Soviet troops to Afghanistan. people
    The final collapse of discharge occurred after entering Soviet troops in Afghanistan in December 1979, KGB special units captured the palace of X. Amin, the President of Afghanistan, who was quite loyal to the USSR, but suspected of sympathizing with China. Amin was killed. President B. Karmal, who was imprisoned with Soviet help, approved the entry of Soviet troops with the appropriate “invitation.” Such an ill-conceived decision was made by only a few members of the Soviet leadership, led by Brezhnev. Even some members of the government learned about this from the newspapers, not to mention the whole people. The world community sharply negatively assessed the actions of the USSR in Afghanistan. An emergency session of the UN General Assembly declared a violation by the Soviet Union of the sovereignty of Third World states. According to official data (which will have to be studied and thoroughly verified), more than 15 thousand Soviet soldiers died in this undeclared war, 35 thousand were wounded, more than 300 were missing or captured. The total losses of the Afghan people amounted to about 1 million people. The participation of the Soviet Union in the Afghan War led to a decline in its authority in the international arena. His contacts with Western countries and the United States have decreased. One of the indicators of this was the refusal of the US Senate to ratify the treaty signed with the Soviet Union on the further limitation of the nuclear arms race (SALT-2). Thus, the foreign policy of the Soviet Union in 1965-1985. passed a difficult path - from a tough confrontation with the West (in the second half of the 60s) to détente of international tension (70s) and from there - to a new aggravation of international relations (in the late 70s and early 80s. ), which brought humanity to the brink of a new world war. The main reason for this was not only the mutual distrust between East and West, the continuation of the arms race, but also the extreme ideologization of foreign policy.

    52. The state of the country after the death of L.I. Brezhnev. Yu.V.Andropov. K.U. Chernenko.

    53.USSR during the period of perestroika (1985-1991): reasons, goals, stages, contradictory nature of the results.

    The concept of "perestroika". Under the influence of perestroika, significant ideological, political, economic, and social changes took place, changing from top to bottom the totality of state and economic structures, established after October 1917 in Russia. Politicians, scientists and publicists have different points of view on this process. Some see in perestroika a counter-revolutionary coup and betrayal of October and socialism; others - the possibility of Russia's development in line with world civilization; third - the onset of “troubled” times and the death of a huge country; fourth - the possibility of returning to the natural-historical path interrupted in 1917.

    First stage(March 1985 - January 1987). This period was characterized by the recognition of some shortcomings of the existing political-economic system of the USSR and attempts to correct them with several large administrative campaigns (the so-called “Acceleration”) - an anti-alcohol campaign, “the fight against unearned income,” the introduction of state acceptance, and a demonstration of the fight against corruption. No radical steps had yet been taken during this period; outwardly, almost everything remained the same. At the same time, in 1985-86, the bulk of the old personnel of the Brezhnev conscription was replaced with a new team of managers.

    Second stage(January 1987 - June 1989). An attempt to reform socialism in the spirit of democratic socialism. Characterized by the beginning of large-scale reforms in all spheres of life of Soviet society. A policy of openness is being proclaimed in public life - easing censorship in the media and lifting bans on what were previously considered taboos. In the economy, private entrepreneurship in the form of cooperatives is being legitimized, and joint ventures with foreign companies are beginning to be actively created. In international politics, the main doctrine is “New Thinking” - a course towards abandoning the class approach in diplomacy and improving relations with the West. Part of the population is overwhelmed by euphoria from the long-awaited changes and freedom unprecedented by Soviet standards. At the same time, during this period, general instability began to gradually increase in the country: the economic situation worsened, separatist sentiments appeared on the national outskirts, and the first interethnic clashes broke out.

    Third stage(June 1989-1991). The final stage, during this period, there is a sharp destabilization of the political situation in the country: after the Congress, the confrontation between the communist regime and the new political forces that emerged as a result of the democratization of society begins. Difficulties in the economy are developing into a full-scale crisis. The chronic shortage of goods reaches its apogee: empty store shelves become a symbol of the turn of the 1980-1990s. Perestroika euphoria in society is replaced by disappointment, uncertainty about the future and mass anti-communist sentiments. Since 1990, the main idea is no longer “improving socialism”, but building democracy and a market economy of the capitalist type. “New thinking” in the international arena comes down to unilateral concessions to the West, as a result of which the USSR is losing many of its positions. In Russia and other republics of the Union, separatist-minded forces come to power - the “parade of sovereignties” begins. The logical result of this development of events was the liquidation of the power of the CPSU and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

    54.Strategy for accelerating socio-economic development and its results. Economic reforms 1987-1988 Options for transition to a market economy

    ACCELERATING THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY- the strategic course of the party, aimed at a qualitative transformation of all aspects of the life of Soviet society.
    The program for accelerating the socio-economic development of the country, put forward by the April (1985) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, received detailed justification in the decisions of the XXVII Party Congress and the January (1987) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. The course to accelerate the socio-economic development of the country presupposes profound transformations in the economy, the implementation of an active social policy, the consistent affirmation of the principle of social justice, the improvement of social relations, the renewal of the forms and methods of work of political and ideological institutions, the deepening of socialist democracy, the decisive overcoming of inertia, stagnation and conservatism . In the economic field, acceleration means, first of all, a decisive overcoming of the negative trends that emerged in the 70-80s and an increase in growth rates.
    In the twelfth five-year plan, it is planned to increase the rate of increase in labor productivity to 23% compared to 16.5% in the eleventh five-year plan. The increase in national income will be 22.1%, real income per capita 14% compared to 16.5 and 11%, respectively. The essence of acceleration is to achieve a new quality of economic growth, that is, based on the full intensification of production, scientific and technological progress, structural restructuring of the economy, effective forms of management, organization and stimulation of labor.
    By 2000, it is planned to double the country's national income without increasing the number of workers in material production and while reducing its metal intensity by 2 times and energy intensity by no less than 1.4 times. By the middle of this period, the capital intensity of production will have to stabilize and then reduce it. In the context of the intensification of social production and the consistent implementation of resource-saving policies, the acceleration of socio-economic development presupposes a focus on increasing the final economic results, improving product quality, producing fundamentally new, more productive equipment, and rapid growth in the efficiency of social labor. Important indicators of acceleration are a reduction in the time required for updating fixed production assets, the range of products, and a radical increase in their technical level and quality.
    To accelerate the socio-economic development of the country, two groups of reserves and sources are put into action. The first of them includes the best use of existing production potential and available labor resources, a decisive fight against losses of raw materials and working time, establishing order, strengthening organization and discipline. The mobilization of these reserves does not, as a rule, require significant costs and produces relatively quick results. In the long term, acceleration requires the use of deep reserves of economic growth, the decisive role among which belongs to scientific and technological progress.
    It is necessary to carry out a radical transformation of the productive forces, based on mastering the latest achievements of the scientific and technological revolution. Of paramount importance is the rapid renewal of the production apparatus through the widespread introduction of advanced technology, the most advanced technological processes and flexible production, which allows for a quick restructuring to produce new products and gives the greatest economic and social effect. Acceleration of the country's socio-economic development also depends on further improvement of the entire system of industrial relations, restructuring of farms and management methods, and the introduction of effective forms of material interest and responsibility. Particular attention is paid to the democratization of all public life, the development of social activity of the masses, and the cultivation of a master's attitude towards work and its results (see also The pace of economic development, Economic policy of the CPSU).

    Economic reforms. The key to the reform strategy of M.S. Gorbachev was to accelerate the rate of economic growth, scientific and technological progress, increase the production of means of production, and develop the social sphere. The priority task of economic reforms was recognized as the accelerated development of mechanical engineering as the basis for the re-equipment of the entire national economy. At the same time, the emphasis was on strengthening production and performance discipline (measures to combat drunkenness and alcoholism); control over product quality (law on state acceptance). The development of the reform was carried out by famous economists (L.I. Abalkin, A.G. Aganbegyan, P.G. Bunin, etc.), it was carried out in accordance with the concept of self-supporting socialism. The reform project included : - expansion of the independence of enterprises on the principles of self-financing and self-financing; - gradual revival of the private sector of the economy, primarily through the development of the cooperative movement; - rejection of the monopoly of foreign trade; - deep integration into the world market; - reduction in the number of sectoral ministries and departments, between which it was assumed establish partnerships; - recognition of equality in rural areas of the five main forms of management (collective farms, state farms, agricultural complexes, rental cooperatives, farms). The implementation of the reform was characterized by inconsistency and half-heartedness. During the transformation, there was no reform of the credit, pricing policy, or centralized supply system. However, despite this, the reform contributed to the formation of the private sector in the economy. In 1988, the Law on Cooperation and the Law on Individual Labor Activity (ILA) were adopted. The new laws opened up the possibility for private activity in more than 30 types of production of goods and services. By the spring of 1991, more than 7 million people were employed in the cooperative sector and another million in self-employment. The downside of this process was the legalization of the “shadow economy.” In 1987, the Law on State Enterprises (Associations) was adopted. Enterprises were transferred to self-sufficiency and self-supporting, receiving the right to foreign economic activity and the creation of joint ventures. At the same time, most of the manufactured products were still included in state orders and, therefore, were withdrawn from free sale. According to the Law on Labor Collectives, a system for electing heads of enterprises and institutions was introduced. Changes in agriculture began with the reform of state and collective farms. In May 1988, it was announced that it would be advisable to switch to rental contracts in rural areas (under a land lease agreement for 50 years with the right to dispose of the products received). By the summer of 1991, only 2% of the land was cultivated under lease conditions (based on the 1989 law on lease and rental relations) and 3% of the livestock was kept. In general, it was not possible to achieve serious changes in agricultural policy. One of the main reasons was the nature of government food policy. For many years, prices for basic food products were maintained at a low level with low growth rates in agricultural production, which was facilitated by subsidies for both the producer (up to 80%) and the consumer (1/3 of the Russian budget) of food. The deficit budget could not cope with such a load. Laws on transferring land into private ownership and increasing household plots were not adopted. Economic results showed the inconsistency of the reforms being carried out. Remaining within the framework of the socialist economic system (universal planning, distribution of resources, state ownership of the means of production, etc.), the country’s national economy also lost the administrative and command levers of coercion on the part of the party. At the same time, no market mechanisms were created. After some initial successes associated with the enthusiasm for renewal, an economic recession began. Since 1988, there has been a general decline in agricultural production. As a result, the population faced a shortage of food products, and even in Moscow their rationed distribution was introduced. Since 1990, a general reduction in industrial production began. In the summer of 1990, instead of acceleration, a course towards a transition to a market economy was proclaimed, scheduled for 1991, i.e., by the end of the 12th Five-Year Plan (1985-1990). However, in contrast to the plans of the official leadership for the gradual (over several years) introduction of the market, a plan was developed (known as the “500 days” program), aimed at a “quick breakthrough” in market relations, supported by the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, B. N. Yeltsin. The authors of the project were a group of economists - Academician S.S. Shatalin, G.A. Yavlinsky, B.G. Fedorov and others. During the first half of the term, it was planned: the transfer of enterprises to forced lease, large-scale privatization and decentralization of the economy, the introduction of antimonopoly legislation. During the second half, it was assumed that government price controls would be removed, allowing for a decline in basic sectors of the economy, regulated unemployment and inflation in order to sharply restructure the economy. This project created a real basis for an economic union of the republics, but contained significant elements of utopianism and could lead to unpredictable social consequences. Under pressure from conservatives, Gorbachev withdrew support for this program.

    The practice of countries that were once part of the “world socialist system” demonstrates two main options for transforming the administrative-command system into a market economy: the first (historically earlier) is the evolutionary path of the gradual creation of market institutions (China and, to a large extent, Hungary); the second is “shock therapy,” which was used with varying degrees of intensity in Russia and most countries of Central and Eastern Europe (in its classical form in Poland).

    The differences between these paths lie in the timing of systemic transformations and stabilization measures, the degree of coverage of the national economy by market mechanisms, the scope of regulatory functions of the state, etc.

    The choice of an evolutionary or “shock” path of transition to a market economy depends not so much on the will of the political leadership, but on a complex of political, economic, social, historical and other factors. The evolutionary transition is supported by the presence of fairly developed agriculture and handicraft production, which employ generations of workers who have retained the skills of private entrepreneurship; the relatively low share of heavy industry and especially the military-industrial complex; stability of the financial system; the predominance among the political and economic elite of layers interested in carrying out reforms, etc.

    Choosing a “shock” option is usually a necessary measure. In most cases, it is associated with the need to overcome the extremely difficult financial situation inherited from the administrative-command system, as well as an acute commodity shortage caused by accumulated structural imbalances.

    55.USSR during the period of perestroika (1985-1991): reform of the political system.